Why would a Good Person make a Bad Argument (Supporting a True Conclusion)? (Recycled)

Originally posted  9/5/08 5:20 PM:

We encounter a similar situation in poetry. The goal of those who teach mechanics and construction of poetry is to implant in their students the ability to compose poetry that is as perfectly balanced and technically correct as that of a born poet. Those who are naturally gifted poets, however, compose beautiful poetry without instruction; they would be stifled by the technical terms and mechanical concepts of formal instruction. (Metzudah Kuzari, page 7)

To say [that only the student of logic can reason well or correctly] would be as mistaken as to say that to run well requires studying the physics and physiology involved in that activity. Some excellent athletes are quite ignorant of the complex processes that go on inside themselves when they perform. And, needless to say, the somewhat elderly professors who know most about such things would perform very poorly where they to risk their dignity on the athletic field…But given the same native keenness of intellect, a person who has studied logic is more likely to reason correctly than one who has never though about the general principles involved in that activity. (Introduction to Logic, Copi, page 4)

Quite often, on any number of issues, a person may believe something that is true for reasons which are faulty or insufficient. It should not be too surprising that some of these individuals prove gifted in presenting their “arguments” in a persuasive manner influencing others to accept their fallacious reasoning. While it is obvious that one presented with such an argument need not accept it, it is quite another thing to dis-affirm the conclusion.

Often the difficulty with various arguments for the existence of God (or other conclusions) is that they are presented in a form that they are not. An argument which the arguer believes to be persuasive is presented as a deductive argument when it is really inductive. Rather than correctly presenting an argument as sufficient reason to accept the existence of God ,the arguer over reaches and implies that God’s existence is the only possible conclusion. Implausible alternatives are deemed impossible. I believe that this tendency is found among the Philosophers who sought absolute proof of the existence of God, and I believe that this is one of the reason the great Sages of Israel largely abandoned the philosophical approach in favor of Emunah Peshuta. Our world is one of concealment of God, and anything else would negate free will. That doesn’t mean that there isn’t reason to believe in God, but that there must be room for an unbeliever to equivocate.

I cannot claim that I am an intellectual purist who would always protest against someone for holding a correct view for the wrong reasons. I suspect that in many instances everyone involved may benefits from turning a blind eye to such logical transgressions. Nevertheless when it comes to defending our faith I think we must be extremely cautious with our choice of arguments. If someone becomes a Ba’al Teshuvah based on reasoning that they latter find to be faulty, then there is great potential for them to become despondent and forsake observance (ח״ו) when they learn of their error. At very least it can become a nagging doubt which the yetzer hara will exploit.

And when we see someone great offer up a problematic argument I suggest that we should approach it the same way as is done in halachah, with a polite צ״ע and a recognition of the Rambam's admontion that, "whenever the words of a person can be interpreted in such a manner that they agree with fully established facts, it is the duty of every educated and honest man to do so."(The Guide for the Perplexed, 3:14, transl. Freidlander page 279)

Apparent Age

In a recent post at Seforim, R. Marc B. Shapiro takes a shot at historical revisionism at the expense of the apparent age approach:

Any written record will be rejected as a YU-Haskalah forgery, or something that God miraculously created to test our faith, all in order to avoid the conclusion that an authentic Torah scholar taught at YU http://seforim.blogspot.com/2009/10/some-assorted-comments-and-selection.html

Leitzanus is making light of the serious, and in my opinion attempts to understand the conflict between the scientific evidence and the Torah's narrative is a serious matter. While is is not clear to me that R. Shapiro would be so dismissive about the apparent age approach itself (since it wasn't really his topic and I don't recall him discussing it in anything I have read), by taking this approach to it's illogical conclusion one creates a false analogy between this position and the absurd example he hypothesized. Such mock-analogies silence a reasoned analysis of differences in favor a smug, hastily-generalized dismissal of such an "absurd" position. Even if it wasn't his intent, and it certainly wasn't his primary one, the damage is done.

Of course there is a major difference between arguing that the world was created with apparent age and the speculative argument that evidence was miraculously planted that a Talmid Chacham worked for an institution deemed politically incorrect. While in the later case we have no reason to assume such a belief, in the former we have God's own account that He created to world from nothing a couple of generations before Yetzias Mitzrayim. Likewise it is a necessary inference that the world would have some appearance of prior age based on the narrative itself, and indications from Chazal that at least the living creatures where created in full stature (despite the fact that such stature would indicate prior age/growth/development in any other context).

Granted, this doesn't in any way give us reason TO accept the Torah's account, it just simply illustrates that the conflict presented by the material evidence need not contradict the Torah's account.

I would add that I don't think that the apparent age needs to be understood as an attempt for God to test us per se. I am inclined to think that a materialistic explanation for the world's existence which seems plausible is necessary for free will. Nevertheless I think that it is reasonable to say that while God chose to create the world as He described, He coordinated the implicit apparent age in such a scenario with how He designed the world to operate according to teiva. Such a "past" isn't false, it is as real as the light we see every night from stars long dead, it is a retroactive existence which, it seems to me, fulfills both a scientific and theological role which complements the Torah as much as it conflicts.

Academic Approach and Emunas Chachamim

נחמיה העמסוני היה דורש כל אתים שבתורה כיון שהגיע "לאת ה' אלהיך תירא" (דברים י) פירוש אמרו לו תלמידיו רבי כל אתים שדרשת מה תהא עליהן? אמר להם, "כשם שקבלתי שכר על הדרישה, כך אני מקבל שכר על פרישה" עד שבא ר"ע ודרש את ה' אלהיך תירא" לרבות תלמידי חכמים. (פסחים כב:ב

Just as we are expected to fear God, we are expected to fear Torah Scholars, Talmidei Chachamim.

Recently at the Rationalist Judaism Blog it was written:

Academic study analyzes the words of Torah scholars over the ages with the aid of examining the context in which they were written. What societal, cultural, intellectual, political factors could have been involved, if any?...If we are talking about reaching historical truth, then I consider the academic method far superior. (rationalistjudaism.com/2009/08/academic-vs-traditionalist-studies.html)

In my estimation this runs afoul of the principle of fearing Torah Sages.

The problem is not in recognizing that a Talmid Chacham holds a problematic view, it is treating our Sages in a casual manner in which they are just like anyone else. The concept that learning Torah l'shma makes a scholar "great and exalts him above all things" (Avos 6:1, from the Artscroll Siddur) is exchanged for a view in which their views and opinions can be evaluated with the same suppositions we would use for any other shmo. One may find that such suppositions are correct on occasion, but to assume that they will be as useful as they are in a general context is not "awe".

The entire endeavor to "discover" a controversial position in the teachings of a Torah scholar doesn't strike me as reflecting awe of our Sage either. The Rambam writes "whenever the words of a person can be interpreted in such a manner that they agree with fully established facts, it is the duty of every educated and honest man to do so." (Guide 3:14, Freidlander translation). While I don't suspect that the Rambam would demand that only a necessary inference should establish that an erroneous position was held, to cull dispersed writings to reveal an non-obvious error (while conceding that theoretically one's entire position could crash down like house of cards by the revelation of a single statement to the contrary) is not in anyway consistent with the Rambam's maxim.

If we are to claim that we accept Judaism, such an acceptance should impact how we evaluate questions pertaining to Judaism. Conflict is inevitable since, “the result of secular research and study will not always coincide with the truths of Judaism, for the simple reason that they do not proceed from the axiomatic premises of Jewish truth.” (Torah Im Derech Eretz, Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch zt’l, page 415)." To apply the principles generally utilized in the humanities to those we view as atypical in their wisdom and piety is to commit the fallacy of Hasty Generalization (or betray that one does not view them as atypical in wisdom and piety). The fact that occasionally such hasty generalizations may turn out correct doesn't negate the fallacy of the method.