Moshav Leitzim

Previously, at asimplejew.blogspot.com I had a back and forth with Reb Chabakuk Elisha about the permissibility of attending sporting events, or other similar venues for entertainment. I would like to take the opportunity to revisit the topic a [very] little more systematically.

Those of you who may remember the earlier discussion should know that there was a source I was keeping silent about. In addition to seeming at such odds with the other sources as I understand them, I was unable to actually read the source:

Divrei Chachamim 5:42

Question: If it is permitted to go to a קרקס, circus, theatre, etc, because of the prohibition of “do not rejoice, Israel, in jubilations like the nations” (as is written in Mishneh Berurah 301:59)?

Response: Rav Chaim Pinchas Scheinberg shlita ruled that nowadays it is permitted since the prohibition was only relevant when their culture was contrary to the Jewish faith”

It would seem that Rav Sheinberg shlita allows one to go to a baseball game or so forth (In Heart to Heart Talks it is recorded that he instructed mothers to allow their children to go to amusements parks, but I believe the issues are a little different). Rav Sheinberg reviewed the psak's brought in his name in the Divrei Chachamim so we can trust that this reflects his opinion, but it is the nature of the work that we are not told his full line of reasoning. I'm not sure that Rav Sheinberg would consider a football game or boxing match to be in the category of entertainment which is not "contrary to the Jewish faith." Indeed the violent aggression in tackle football or boxing is enough that I'm not certain one is allowed to play them, i.e. the issue is even more than that of moshav leitzim. Nevertheless it seems to me that Rav Sheinberg's position does not appear to be shared by other Gedolei HaPoskim of our lifetime and is difficult to square with the earlier sources:

T’hillim 1:1

“The praises of a man are that he did not follow the counsel of the wicked, neither did he stand in the way of sinners nor sit in the company of scorners.”

Rashi on T’hillim 1:2

“But his desire is in the law of the Lord”—Hence you learn that the [trait of the] company of scorners brings one to neglect of the study of Torah.”

From this Rashi it would seem that Moshav Leitzim, a "company of scorners", is an issue not because of specifically unkosher activities, even bitul Torah, but because it produces bitul Torah as a habit.

Based on the Gemara in Avodah Zarah 18b this concept is brought down in the halachah:

Magen Avraham 307:22

“Because of the prohibition against participation in a gathering of scoffers.” And this is the ruling for one who goes to theaters and circuses which are places of amusement as stated in Avodah Zarah 18b and places of pastime….”

Chayei Adam Hilchos T’fillah u’Brachos 63:17

“The Bach wrote in the name of Sefer HaEshkol [to guard yourself from seeing?] hunts of the gentiles, and this is the ruling for their dances or any type of their celebrations. And if you hear the sound of gentile feasting or rejoicing, lament and grieve over the destruction of Jerusalem, and pray to the Holy One blessed be He about this. And about this it is said, “Do not rejoice, Israel, like the exultations of the peoples.” [Hosea 9:1, adapted from Stone Edition Tanach]. Additionally there is with all of this [a prohibition of participating in a] “gathering of scoffers”, and even if it is [held by] Jews. And Chazal said in tractate Avodah Zarah (18a) “Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi expounded, ‘Happy is the man who does not walk in the counsel of the wicked’ (T’hillim 1:1) this is one who walks to theaters and to circuses (Rashi explains, ‘a palace, and anything when they gather to laugh and scoff.’) ‘And in the path of sinners he does not stand’ (ibid), this is one who doesn’t stand in hunts (Rashi explains, ‘trapping wild animals by means of dogs and any action of their done for laughter or rejoicing.’) ‘And in a gathering of scoffers he does not sit.’ (ibid) he does not sit in their councils.” .....

Mishneh Berurah 307:59 (Translation from the Feldheim Edition)

“Because of the prohibition against participation in a gathering of scoffers.” One certainly transgress this prohibition if he goes to theaters and circuses [which are places of amusement [שְׂחוֹק] as stated in Avodah Zarah, 18b] or participates in other pastimes. Even on Purim, only merriment that is intended to remind one of the miracles that occurred in the time of Achashveirosh is permitted [M.A.] Nowadays, because of our many sins, some people are completely unrestrained in this matter and go to theaters, despite the fact that Scripture cries out saying, “do not rejoice, Israel, in jubilations.” (Hosheya 9:1) One also transgresses the prohibition against inciting one’s evil inclination if he goes there, and our Sages of blessed memory said, “Whoever scoffs, falls into Geyhinnom, as it is written, etc., and suffers afflictions even in this world, as it is written, ‘and now, do not scoff, lest your afflictions become heavier.” [See additional sayings and quotations regarding this matter in the Gemara there.]

Aruch HaShulchan 307:9

“And this is the ruling for one who goes to theaters and circuses which are places of amusement and pastime.”

It is difficult to say that there is any inherent difference between the theater today and the theater in the days of the Magen Avraham or the Mishneh Berurah which would be come out in favor of theaters today. Certainly modern theaters routinely display scenes which would not have been acceptable even to non-Jews of that era. And while my translation skills aren't the best but it seems that the Aruch HaShulchan agrees that this prohibition applies to contemporary theaters and not merely those which featured gladiators and the like. Furthermore we must remember that there seems to be a concern about habituation of bitul Torah.

Igros Moshe O.C. 2:95

“And on the matter of entering a theater or movies, behold, it is something forbidden, and how is it relevant to permit removing one’s hat and being bare headed for it? He adds sin on top of his sin. And if the question is about one who is seized by his inclination to go there, and will not listen to not going, perhaps it is good that he remove his hat so that there will not be a chilul Hashem, since they will not know he is a Torah observant Jew. This is a great reason but only if intended l’shem shemayim. However since it is implausible to say that one seized by the inclination actually has intent l’shem shamaym, rather to belittle the matter even further with uncovering his head, therefore there is nothing to permit it.”

Not only does he apply the prohibition to contemporary theaters, he applies it to sports stadiums:

Igros Moshe Y.D. 4 simon 11

"However when there is a reason for doing so such as with theaters and [circus?], which are [mentioned] in Avodah Zarah 18b, which are leitzanus, there isn't an issue of avodah zarah, even though it is prohibited on the side of leitzanus, and all that go there transgress the prohibition of moshav leitzim and bitul Torah--not only at this moment-- but he will be caused to completely neglect Torah as explained there. And all the more so with the theaters found now in our lands, and so with sports arenas."

And bearing the involvement of Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach zt'l (particularly in the footnotes) with Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasa it is significant that Chapter 16 footnote 25 applies the above Mishneh Berurah to attending sporting events on the weekdays. One should also note Shulchan Shlomo 307:26 which indicates those things classified moshav leitzim were prohibited because of bitul Torah.

Likewise we find that the prohibition applies when it is under "Jewish" auspices:

Mishneh Berurah 224:3

“It is stated in the Gemara that it is even prohibited to go to a Jewish hunt or theater, since this is equivalent to participation in a gathering of scoffers.”

This is also the ruling of the Magen Avraham 224:3, further emphasizing that the concerns where not bloodshed, idolatry, or pritzus per se.

Now, we all know that we need to relax, each according to his or her need. Moshav Leitzim does not apply to just any recreation. According to HaRav Ovadia Yosef shlita going to the Zoo, for example, is permitted. What is the difference if it is not the content which we are concerned about?

Note the diagram at the top of the post which illustrates they dynamics of watching a sporting event. The same is true of attending theater or a circus. It is a collective experience where the audience passively fixate on a central display of entertainment. It is the group aspect of the event which seems to be most problematic since it means that the event is dictating when you will refrain from learning Torah, not your own need to relax, and your decision to refrain from learning is ratified by the excitement of the crowd.

Going to the Zoo, or park, camping, hiking, biking, etc. there is no such central focus. You choose your own adventure, generally on your own terms.

This is, it seems to me, one aspect of problematic "entertainment" in contrast with needed "relaxation".

Other activities, more private ones, present issues of Moshav Leitzim too. Certain literature is prohibited by the Shulchan Aruch in OC 307 and although the Rama is lenient may authorities include playing Chess and "similar" games in the prohibition of Moshav Leitzim. In these instances it would seem that the problem is more of an issue of the amount of time needed involvement in such activities (such as learning the otherwise useless rules).

Now of course there is the famous:

Avos 3:3

“Rabbi Chanina ben Tradyon says: If two sit together and there are no words of Torah between them, it is a [gathering of scoffers], as it is said ‘In the [gathering of scoffers] he does not sit.” (Thillim 1:1).”

It would seem that when the activity isn't merely passive entertainment, but has a ruchnius quality, then the prohibition of Moshav Leitzim does not apply. This would seem to include a cheder play or a religious concert. Perhaps, just perhaps, this might be part of the consideration in reports of major Yeshivos taking their talmidim to ball games. While it could be argued that it might be misleading as to what the halachah is, it may be that the Rebbeim reckoned that such an outing in the "Yeshiva" context would give chizuk to boys who might otherwise have found it difficult to dedicate themselves to learning Torah and therefore in such a case it would lead more learning Torah rather than less. The talmidim get needed relaxation, albeit when they are told to relax, while bonding with other talmidim. I'm not so certain that it is the best line of reasoning, or the one utilized, but one could make a case...

Which brings me to the next point, that it may not be the best thing to bring this topic up. Regarding playing chess for gain the Rama (O.C. 338:5) says: Nevertheless, one should not protest to women and children who play for gain, since in view of the fact they will not heed us it is preferable that they transgress be-shogeyg (in ignorance of the fact that they are transgressing) rather than be-meyzid (knowing that they are committing a transgression).” Perhaps the same could be said here, after all it is said that one can often find frum yidden, even Chassidim, and ball games. In the later part of the Chayei Adam cited above he writes that even in his generation there were lomdim who weren't careful to refrain from speaking leitzanus (mockery). There are, however, plenty of sources available which speak of this prohibition so it seems safe to discuss it openly, but it could be that some do feel that way but aren't going to be discussing the prohibition openly in order that they should explain they don't think it should be discussed openly.

And, it could be that I'm all wet. If anyone has any sources to add which would present an opposing view point I would greatly appreciate it. Even if you doubt I would be persuaded, believe me anything that can help me be dan l'kaf zchus is always appreciated. But it seems to me that the oft repeated claim that this only applied when there was idolatry or gladiators seems to have no basis whatsoever in the Poskim. Likewise while Rav Scheinberg is a gadol and I could not fault his talmidim for accepting his psak, it seems very difficult to make a distinction between these events in the time of the Magen Avraham or Mishneh Berurah (even Jewish operated events) and now to permit them. This is especially when we consider that the motivating factor for the prohibition is that not only is one not learning Torah but that it will lead to more bitul Torah down the line.

Update

In the above (I believe) I did not address the issue of watching Television. I have an impression that their is a psak by Rav Moshe Feinstien zt'l, Rav Shach zt'l, and as I recall Rav Kamenetzky zt'l (?) which says watching Television is ossur, but I have not been able to see this inside. Nevertheless, while I am inclined to believe that their is halachic issues which may be strong enough to present an issur, my understanding of Moshav Leitzim as presented above would preclude Television as a medium from this category (although, like a book, a program could be "moshav leitzim" based on content). That is to say the same otherwise "kosher" show seen at a movie theater would be moshav leitzim, while it is not in the comfort of your own home. It seems that this understanding has support in a teshuvah of the Mishneh Halachos (6:270) of Rabbi Menashe Klein shlita discussed here.

It was also interesting to notice that among his text message psakim, Rabbi Shlomo Aviner shlita has the following:

Q: Is it a sanctification of Hashem's Name if an Israeli sports team is victorious?
A: No. To be a sanctification of Hashem, it needs to be a mitzvah, and competitive sports are a "Moshav Leitzim" (frivolity).

John, this one's for you

While I recognize that other people do visit this site, and apologize for not having something more universally relevant, I thought that, well, this is right up your alley John. Maybe you can answer the question, "Anyone want to tell us what it's about?"

http://onthemainline.blogspot.com/2009/02/r-jonathan-eybeschuetz-in-nearly.html

Genetics and Apparent Age

I'm terribly sorry for the drought of posts and thank all who have continued stopping by.

Previously we have shown that the default in our tradition is that the narratives of the Torah are to be taken literally and any allegorical truth is in addition to the pshat. We have noted that additional apparent age is a logical necessity from the literal account of B'reshis and not just a speculative possibility. We have also seen that the common decent of man from our common ancestor Adam is a fundamental principle and argued that even according to the more liberal standard of the Rambam it may not be permissible to reject the literal meaning of a Torah passage without deductive proof.

I would like to pause to re-emphasize the significance of this last point. In order to discuss the propriety of allegorizing the Torah we must accept for the argument that there is good reason to believe it to be Divine Revelation and therefore true. Otherwise in the absence of such reason there is no justification for allegorizing an account that has no indications it is merely a metaphor, but rather we would logically conclude it was simply an erroneous account. [Recently a commenter at another blog argued that there was textual basis to understand the account allegorically in the term "day" being used before the creation of the sun. When I pointed out that "day" was largely understood literally, he responded that a couple hundred years ago that is how they probably would of understood it too!]

So accepting that the Torah is true, and recognizing that the burden of proof is on those who wish to say that truth is allegorical and not-literal, then we must recognize that B'reshis is essentially divinely revealed testimony about how the world was created. We also must recognize that God's general plan was that the world operate according to the laws of nature as we know them. If God has told us He created the world in a certain manner but to have done so would essentially require miraculous intervention in nature for it to be as it is today, it is an argument from silence to argue that God didn't make such interventions and therefore posit that His testimony is really allegorical.

Wolfishmusings.blogspot.com/2007/02/goodbye-gosse.html makes an argument that seems to be a very good way at "testing" the Apparent Age approach's ability to solve the difficulties. In it he points out that through genetics science can identify when a species most recently shared a single common ancestor and it is common that they have not shared a common ancestor since long before Adam HaRishon's time.

In the generations following the Mabul, but especially those from Adam HaRishon, would not have enough genetic variety to support a healthy population. The association between birth defects and relatives, especially siblings, reproducing has long been recognized. Divine intervention would not be a matter of hashgacha pratis, but merely of hashgacha klalis, a necessary measure for the healthy development of the species.

Conceding that such divine intervention took place, as we must from an account which on the one hand presents the origin of the species from at the most a handful of pairs and on the other is completely unconcerned with the long known and statistically significant chance of genetic defects from such unions, it is more reasonable than not that the genetic variation necessary would be correlated with the general plan He had for the biological laws of nature. Again, while the account does not explicitly elaborate on such an intervention, it is a necessary condition for the simple meaning of the account even based on a pre-modern understanding of the reproduction of close relatives. And if something is inferred by necessity by the simple meaning then evidence which it can account for does not provide sufficient reason to allegorize the account.

Now it is all well and good to argue that apparent age is a logical necessity for the simple meaning of the text, and that divine intervention in the gene pool is also a logical necessity. It is not, however, logically necessary that there be a correlation between apparent age and genetics. But neither is there correlation an argument for allegorization. And while it is not logically necessary, insofar as the world was created as a way to conceal God to allow for free will, the alignment of the physical evidence in a [generally] unified and coherent scientific/materialistic system, despite several directly supernatural occurrences, is understandable if not expected.

I hope to elaborate/explore the role of free will's relevance to the natural world more thoroughly later, as well as the relationship between the teivah/nature as God way of running the world and it's applicability to the pre-Creation era/Retroactive Existence.

I do not mean to make light of the challenge this argument presents, but starting with the assumption that we have reason to believe that the Torah is God's account of Creation I do not believe the challenge is sufficient to disregard it. And if we remember that, insofar as common ancestry via Adam HaRishon is a "fundamental principle" which cannot be allegorized if there is any other alternative even according to the Rambam, the theoretical possibility of divine intervention negates the basis to allegorize even without the above reasons to infer it occurred. The conclusions of genetics are immanently reasonable inferences from the scientific evidence, not deductive/demonstrable proof of what occurred.

The Rambam warns that if one, "reject[s] things as impossible which have never been proved to be impossible, or which are in fact possible, though their possibility be very remote, then you will be like Elisha Aher; you will not only fail to become perfect, but will become exceedingly imperfect" (Guide 1:32, Freidlander page 42, emphasis mine).

Sinning Bare-Headed

Igros Moshe O.C. 2:95
“And on the matter of entering a theater or movies, behold, it is something forbidden, and how is it relevant to permit removing one’s hat and being bare headed for it? He adds sin on top of his sin. And if the question is about one who is seized by his inclination to go there, and will not listen to not going, perhaps it is good that he remove his hat so that there will not be a chilul Hashem, since they will not know he is a Torah observant Jew. This is a great reason but only if intended l’shem shemayim. However since it is implausible to say that one seized by the inclination actually has intent l’shem shamayim, rather to belittle the matter even further with uncovering his head, therefore there is nothing to permit it.”

Kol Koreh against Gezel Sheina

HaMercaz has a notice by the Rabbanim of Kiriyat Sanz requesting that it's residents not to work on constructing their Succos after 10 P.M. out of consideration for their neighbors and their sleep, especially the elderly, children, and the ill.

ודברים אלו נוגעים לשכנים ומדות שבין אדם לחברו שאין יום הכיפורים מכפר

ורח"ל דבר שגורם למחלוקת בין השכנים וכדי שלא יהיה ח"ו מצוה הבאה בעבירה

"And these maters are relevant to neighbors and good manners 'between a person and his fellow' about which Yom Kippur doesn't atone.

And God forbid that something should descend into strife between neighbors, so that it will not be (chas v'Shalom) a 'mitzvah that comes by way of a transgression.'

Some how notices like this don't get as wide of circulation on line as more "sensational" ones.

Rav Chaim Berlin zt'l on Chassidim

The Seforim Blog has a very interesting, and I believe important, psak of Rav Chaim Berlin zt'l, which apparently has been left out of a new edition of his teshuvos:

ולהתפלל בבית הכנסת של החסידים אין שום חשש בזה, וגזירת רבינו הגר"א ז"ל לא הי' אלא בזמנו שהקילו אז בכבוד תלמידי חכמים לומדי תורה, ולא כן בימינו שהחסידים חולקים כבוד לכל לומדי תורה והם יראי ה' ושומרים תורה ומצוה

"And to pray in a Chassidic synagogue, there isn't any reason to be concerned about this. The decree of our Master the Gra z'l (HaGoan Rav Eliyahu zt'l, the Vilna Gaon) was only in his time since they were lax then regarding the honor of scholars who study Torah, and this is not so on our days when the Chassidim give honor to all students of Torah, and they are God fearing and observe Torah and Mitzvos."

Parshas Vayeira: The Expulsion of Hagar

I apologize for allowing Shabbos to pass without having posted on the parsha. Truthfully the only thing I could think of was a counter-missionary theme which I just couldn’t bring myself to write. There’s a lot I want to write on that topic but I burnt out a long time ago. Then, over Shabbos, the obvious post came to me.

In parshas Vayeira we read of Hagar being expelled from the house of Avraham Avinu after Yishmael’s behavior proves to be a spiritual and/or physical danger to Yitzchak. The more attentive may have noticed that it was only the parsha before when we read that Hagar had previously left Avraham’s household. The similarities are obvious. In either instance we find that Hagar leaves in reaction to Sarah Imeinu and subsequently is found in the desert by an angel near water.

But from there the two passages drastically differ. On the one hand we see that the earlier account in Chapter 16 uses the name of Hashem throughout, while our account (Chapter 21) uses Eloqim. It is little surprise then, that proponents of the Document Hypothesis attribute the former account to J (at least those verses which deal with Hagar running away, there are a few verses which are attributed to P) while the later account is attributed to E.

Other differences, however, are much more significant to the narrative and seem to imply that we are dealing with two entirely separate incidents and not merely different traditions of one event being preserved along side each other. Even without being familiar with the narratives the astute reader may have noticed above that the narrative in our Parsha is about Hagar being expelled while the prior account is one of her running away. In the earlier account it was her decision, albeit in order to escape Sarah, while in our parsha the decision was made for her. In our parshah she is expelled along with Yishmael, because of Yishmael’s behavior, while in the earlier account Yishmael had yet to be born and the friction in the household was attributed to her attitude. In the first account she is found safe beside a spring of water, while in the later she and Yishmael are saved from dying of thirst by the angel.

Perhaps the most significant difference between the two accounts is that in the initial account Hagar is instructed by the angel to return. The account in our parsha represents a final departure of Hagar and Yishmael from Avraham’s household. Without the later account there is no final resolution of the conflict in the former. This is especially so when we consider that the angel’s instruction for Hagar to return was by no means accompanied by any assurance that things would be easier, but rather that she was expected to submit to Sarah (16:9) and that the son she was to bear was going to live a life of conflict (16:12). To place our parsha’s narrative in, essentially, a separate book would leave the story incomplete. In fact, as near as I can tell “J” never really gets around to Yishmael even being born much less give any indication of the outcome of the instruction to return.

Hagar’s relationship with Sarah was broken. Although God’s Attribute of Mercy, indicated by the use of the name Hashem, assured that Yishmael had the benefit of spending his formative years in the presence of Avraham his father (an experience which undoubtedly made it easier for him to eventually do teshuva), this was not a long term solution. The issues which created the initial conflict were not resolved and eventually were manifest in Yishmael, at which point God with His Attribute of Judgment sided with Sarah that they could not stay and risk harming the well being of Yitzchak. It is hardly unprecedented for a troubled family to “reconcile” only to once again face separation when the problems continue or worsen. These two accounts are much more coherent when taken together than as two competing versions of the same story.

Chayei Sarah: The Eliezer Doublet

The bulk of Parshas Chayei Sarah is the well known account of Avrohom sending his servant, whom we are told is Eliezer (see Genesis 15:2), to find a wife from among Avrohom’s family for his son Yitzchok (Genesis 24). After traveling to Aram Naharim he waited by the well and prayed that God would send Yitzchok a proper shidduch to be identified by responding to his request for water with an offer to water his camels also. Rivka arrives and exceeds expectation.

When Rivka and Eliezer arrived at her home to meet her family, relatives of Avrohom, we are confronted with one of the clearest examples of a repetitive narrative to be found in the Chumash. Sixteen pesukim, almost as much as either of the two other narratives in this parsha, are dedicated to Eliezer telling Rivka’s family about the events we have just read about, with a few small differences.

From a purely stylistic standpoint this is hugely redundant. It, for all practical purposes, could be described as a doublet, “A doublet is a case of the same story being told twice. Even in translation it is easy to observe that biblical stories often appear with variation in detail in two different places in the Bible. There are two different stories of the creation of the world. There are two stories of the covenant between God and the patriarch Abraham…” (Who Wrote the Bible? Richard Elliot Freedman, page 22). Why was it necessary to give a full review rather than simply a generic one similar to that found in verse 30, “Thus has the man spoken to me”? Certainly this passage is much more repetitive, and more noticeable, than the account of creation found in Genesis 2.

But while this narrative has the stylistic difficulty which otherwise suggest to academics that we have multiple sources, such a position isn’t really helpful here. This repetition is totally dependant upon the original. The context of the account is clearly one of Eliezer telling the story, which requires the events to have already transpired. Furthermore, we might note, that the use of the divine names in either part of the narrative is consistent.

Presumably for these very reasons this narrative, despite its repetitive nature, is attributed in its entirety to “J” by Freidman (ibid page 248) and is not really considered a doublet. So while it may be argued that generally it is easier to attribute such “redundant” accounts to multiple sources in this case we are simply faced with the fact that the author/editor/redactor was content with presenting the material in a way that we would not choose stylistically. And when one notes the subtle differences I would argue that at least in this case “Those who defended the traditional belief” and argued that the differences “came to teach us a lesson by their ‘apparent’ contradiction” where correct. (see ibid page 22).

יפה שיחתן של עבדי אבות לפני המקום מתורתן של בניהם

R. Gil Student has followed up his post Seven Unconvincing Arguments for the Documentary Hypothesis with the veryinteresting Lot and the Flood.

Natural Selection is Apikorses. Period. (כנ"ל anyways)

In light of my earlier discussion on Creation Yesh m’Ayin inevitably leading to the appearance of age (and perhaps best thought of as actual "Retroactive Existence") prior to that creation, one might recognize that I have a tendency to let empirical science operate according to its own methods and assumptions and see no inherent need to conform its conclusions to the Torah and certainly no need to conform Torah to its conclusions. I suspect that there are those who will see such an approach as either radically liberal and to still others it will appear stubbornly conservative. For the most part I believe that the same conclusions apply to the evidence of the fossil record and genetics (I know I still owe you a post on this one) with respect to the Theory of Evolution. There is one important caveat to my position on Evolution that I must discuss.

Reading various discussions amongst Orthodox Jews regarding how to relate to Evolution, and works which discuss it, I was always aggravated by two interrelated problems. One was that the primary focus was always on the “history” side of the equation, which I found to be of little to no consequence. The second was those who sought to live their lives and form their opinions based on Torah, but found it absolutely inconceivable that one could identify Evolution as heresy (even though HaRav Moshe Feinstein zt’l paskened to edit/censor textbooks which contained such references[1]). The common denominator to either issue is the overlooking the real problem with evolution: Natural Selection.

“natural selection the mechanism proposed by Charles DARWIN by which gradual evolutionary changes take place. Organisms that are better adapted to the environment in which they live produce more viable young, increasing their proportion in the population and, therefore, being selected. Such a mechanism depends on the variability of individuals within the population. The variability arises through MUTATION, the beneficial mutants being preserved by NATURAL SELECTION.” (The Harper Collins Dictionary: Biology, Page 377).

For the theist who seeks to incorporate Evolution into his or her worldview, whether due to not wishing to seem as a boor to academia or due to an actual understanding and acceptance of the empirical evidence which underlies Evolution, I believe the full implication of Natural Selection and its philosophical significance have been overshadowed. The notion that variations in a population allow them to adapt better to their environment and in turn to be more successful in producing offspring is essentially observable so in light of the other evidence it does not seem improbable to attribute such adaptation could lead to speciation given sufficient time.

Nevertheless “Natural Selection” is not just “natural selection” of variations which help the species adapt. More is implied by the term.

“This thesis is the Principle of the Origin of Species by Natural Selection. It asserts that natural selection operating on variations is not only a sufficient condition for the origin of a species but also the only sufficient condition[2] for the origin of any species” (The Logic and Methodology of Science and Pseudoscience, Fred Wilson, page 150).

Not only can such a process be understood as a theory in accordance with the laws of nature, but it can and should be understood as in and of itself sufficient to explain the existence of life and all of its species without any divine guidance. Any attempt at suggesting a Creator’s involvement is unnecessary and undesirable. “Guided” evolution is anathema to “Natural Selection”.

This distinction is not merely the later spin of those antagonistic to faith. Already in Darwin’s writings we read such an implication.

“Several writers have misapprehended or objected to the term Natural Selection. Some have even imagined that natural selection induces variability, whereas it only implies the preservation of such variations as arise and are beneficial to the being under its condition of life…Others have objected that the term selection implies conscious choice in the animals which becomes modified; and it has even been urged that, as plants have no volition, natural selection is not applicable to them! It has been said that I speak of natural selection as an active power or Deity” (The Origin of the Species, Charles Darwin Chapter 4 page 89, Mentor Edition).

Darwin found it necessary to respond to early detractors who did not find his use of the term “natural selection” materialistic enough. Whether a deity, choice of the animal itself, or a force in and of itself, their understanding of “natural selection” was deemed to be too active. Darwin reassured them “natural selection” was merely a passive description of the positive outcome brought by random changes which proved beneficial to that species. “Natural Selection” is only personified by verbal necessity, in truth it meant to obviate the need for such active design of variation. It is a strictly material process which allows the clock to function in the absence of the clockmaker, if indeed there was a clock maker.

Such a view is unacceptable within Judaism. It is one thing to interpret data in exclusively according to the laws of Nature. It is quite another to declare the laws of Nature independent of the Creator. The laws of Nature are entirely dependent upon the existence of Hashem, “If one would imagine that He does not exist, no other being could possibly exist” (Rambam Yesodei HaTorah 1:3). While one may recognize that something has a naturalistic explanation one may not deny God’s active participation since nature itself is an act of God.

This is the real the heart of the conflict between Torah and Evolution and the common philosophy of science in the academic world today. Prior to the theory of Evolution many issues which we consider conflicts between religion and science had arisen, but none had led to such a degree of agnosticism and atheism. While material explanations could be found for the works of nature, the existence of the Universe and especially life in its complexity testified to the existence of a Designer. But Darwin’s theory of “Natural Selection” seemed to provide the mechanism by which, by chance, variations could lead to the multiplicity of life forms on Earth. “The British biologist Richard Dawkins, an outspoken defender of Darwin and nonbeliever famously wrote that evolution ‘made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist.” (Newsweek Nov. 18, 2005 page 56). Even life, it seemed, could now be understood as originating in a strictly materialist way without resorting to a Creator.

Darwin was not, however, the first to suggest life in its complexity originated through a serious of chances.

First Theory—There is no Providence at all for anything in the Universe;…This is the theory of Epicurus, who assumes also that the Universe consists of atom, that these have combined by chance, and have received their various forms by mere accident…Aristotle has proved the absurdity of the theory, that the whole Universe could have originated by chance; he has shown that, on the contrary, there is a being that rules and governs the Universe. Guide to the Perplexed 282

“But it would be quite useless to mention the opinions of those who do not recognize the existence of God, but believe that the existing state of things is the result of accidental combination and separation of the elements, and that the Universe has no Ruler or Governor. Such is the theory of Epicurus and his school, and similar philosophers, as stated by Alexander [Aphrodisiensis]; it would be superfluous to repeat their views, since the existence of G-d has been demonstrated whilst their theory is built upon a basis proved to be untenable.” (Guide to the Perplexed page 173, emphasis mine)

The Aruch explains that the Hebrew term for “heretic”, Apikores, was derived from the Greek philosopher Epicurus. Epicurus’ belief that the world was the result of accident and chance could be understood as the archetypal k’firah (heresy). But Epicurus’ approach wasn’t rejected because it failed to provide a natural history account of the origin of the species; it was rejected because any such scenario based on chance was in-credible. Darwin’s observations about the fossil record, variations in species allowing them to adapt better, and his recognition that better adaptation increases the possibility of survival and reproduction produced a theory which far exceeded anything Epicurus could have produced in his wildest dreams with respect to a natural history. But Darwin’s theory did no more to show that such natural processes could be plausibly understood as accidental occurrences independent of Design. The argument from design doesn’t assert that we cannot account for creation by “natural means”. Rather it argues that it cannot be relegated to chance. To the materialist who believed that if God existed, He played no active part in the running of the world, the possibility of explaining our development according to natural laws was automatically equated with confirmation of this materialistic assumption. But there is a difference between explaining a process, albeit “natural”, and demonstrating that process is possible by mere chance. As evidence for strict materialism “Natural Selection” was preaching to the choir. It allowed an atheist to feel “intellectually fulfilled”, but in truth it only pushed the argument from design under the rug.

The difficulty with Natural Selection is not the process but the philosophical assumption that is bundled in with the term in its standard use. Undoubtedly there are many scientists who in their own philosophy of science are much more liberal in their understanding of “natural selection”. They may not have difficulty understanding it as a naturalistic explanation that does not demand rejection of the supernatural, or at least are not bothered by those who take such an approach. Perhaps it is perfectly acceptable for a theist to speak of “natural selection”, but despite the clear overlap in meaning it is essentially only verbal agreement. We may accept survival of the fittest as a natural law, not as a self-sufficient explination for the creation of the species. Perhaps a book which speaks of natural selection without explicitly discussing its hard-line philosophical rejection of the supernatural may not be strictly prohibited, but it might be analogous to a Christian discussion on the Unity of God which doesn’t directly address their belief in the Trinity.[3] Should such need arise one must consult a competent Posek. Any work which speaks of “Natural Selection” in such a way that it is obviously meant to preclude the need, or even possibility, of the Divine is heretical and forbidden to be read by Jewish law other than the purposes of refuting them. Regardless of one’s feelings regarding evolution, Darwin’s Theory of Natural Selection contains elements which are heretical and forbidden by Jewish law to believe or to study.

[1]It appears to me that while Rav Feinstein zt’l did not explicitly mention evolution etc. but being a p’sak on practical halachah the only reasonable inference is it discussed such subject matter and it is impossible to infer he spoke of only hypothetical k’firah.

[2]“A sufficient condition for the occurrence of an event is a circumstance in whose presence the event must occur.” (Introduction to Logic, Irving M. Copi, page 400, bold mine)

[3]The difference being one can think of better reasons to learn from a science textbook than a Christian theological discussion of G-d’s unity but…

Image of planet outside our solar system.

Parshas Lech Lecha: The Master of the Mansion

Our tradition begins with Avrohom Avinu. He is the physical, but even more so the spiritual, father of the Jewish people. The narrative of the Chumash does not enlighten us on the youth of Avrohom Avinu or the origin of his awareness of Hashem. Upon our “introduction” to him he is already receiving the prophetic instruction to leave his homeland for Eretz Ca’anan. Chazal, whether by tradition, inference from the text, or homily, provide us much more information about this period. We are given a glimpse into the world of Avrohom and how he came into recognition of the Holy One blessed be He. This information was not transmitted out of mere historical or biographical curiosity, but in an effort to implant the emunah of Avrohom into our own hearts.

בראשית רבה לך לך לט:א

א"ר יצחק משל לאחד שהיה עובר ממקום למקום. וראה
בירה אחת דולקת. אמר תאמר שהבירה הזו בלא מנהיג. הציץ עליו בעל הבירה. א"ל אני הוא
בעל הבירה. כך לפי שהיה בעל העולם

In the B’reishis Rabba on Parshas Lech Lecha (39:1) R. Yitzchak relates that Avrohom Avinu was like a traveler who encountered a certain mansion. The traveler wondered if it were possible that such a mansion could be without a master. It is not consistent without our experience for mansions to occur on their own. The existence of the mansion leads one to infer that there is a master responsible for its existence and maintenance.

Rav Sa’adia Goan uses a similar analogy in his “Emunos v’Deos”:

Furthermore I say that if they are right, so far as their doctrine of chance is concerned, let them show us or state that it is possible for the parts of a house, namely the stones and the wood, to unite by themselves and fall into order and combine so as to constitute a house.[1]

Avrohom Avinu, with his great spiritual sensitivity and purity of heart, was able to perceive that the very existence of the world implied that there was a Creator. This point was made later on by the Creator Himself in His rhetorical question to the prophet Yeshayahu, “Lift up your eyes on high and see, who created these, who takes out their host by number; all of them He calls by name; because of His great might and because He is strong in power, no one is missing.” (Isaiah 40:26) Similarly we read in T’hillim, “The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament tells of His handiwork” (19:2).

Avrohom Avinu was able to see more clearly the very basic inference which is at the heart of the nearly universal human search for the divine. We must therefore attempt to understand why the entire world isn’t similarly enlightened by this truth even as they maintain a basic cognizance of it.

First we must recognize the nature of the inference here. The Rambam in his Moreh Nuvachim[2] addresses this inference, and employs it, but does not find it sufficient. Due to the prevailing (and ancient) disagreement among the philosophers about whether the universe had a beginning or not, the argument would not be compelling, not be conclusive, for those who held the opinion that the universe was eternal (a position that I do not believe has much relevance today). The Rambam felt that it was the best approach to take was to provide such arguments that would not be refutable. The Rambam wanted the existence of the Creator to be demonstrated conclusively. Similarly we have the Kuzari who argues that Moshe Rabbeinu identified God as the “God of the Hebrews” when speaking to Pharaoh (Ex. 7:16) rather than as the “God of heaven and earth” or as the Creator, since Pharaoh would have denied creation.[3] We must therefore consider the two types of arguments as are known from the science of logic, a deductive argument and an inductive argument. A deductive argument is one where, insofar as the premises are correct, the conclusion is demonstrably proven from those premises and nothing more could be added that could possible change the truth of that conclusion. An inductive argument, on the other hand is one where the conclusion follows logically from the premises but there remains a possibility, even if it is an exceedingly remote one, that the conclusion could be shown incorrect if other proof where presented. While fools can grandstand and ignore the truth of any conclusion no matter how firmly established, the correctness of an inductive argument is clearly more subjective and it is much easier to ignore such an argument’s strength and still hold a pretext of reason. Both the Rambam and the Kuzari seemed to recognize that our inference was of this later category of inductive reasoning and felt that in the various contexts another approach was more appropriate.

We should not, however, mistakenly assume that this represents a חסרון in the reasoning חו״ש. Much of what we “know” is based off of inductive reasoning, and insofar as very few premises, if any, are actually known with absolute certainty, most of our reasoning has a strong inductive element. Despite all of the interesting and perhaps at times useful philosophical/epistemological questions one might pose, we would be intellectually paralyzed without such inductive reasoning. While the Rambam, like other philosophers, would prefer a deductive argument which provides demonstrable proof, I believe that the majority of our Rabbi’s (especially among the Acharonim) have guided us down the path of Emunah Peshuta. We are not asked to believe that which there is no reason to believe, but we are expected to content ourselves with the very basic truth that if not impossible, then it is inconceivable that creation not have a Creator.

Furthermore, this cloud of uncertainty, as slight as it is, plays a very important, even essential, role. Insofar as the existence of the Creator is the fundamental truth with which mankind must reckon, God’s plan for man having free choice (which cannot be dealt with at length here) would require that there be an alternative explanation to the existence of the world than a Creator. While this alternative does not have to be “possible” strictly speaking, it must at least seem plausible enough that those who so chose can grasp onto such a position, while at the same time not so compelling as to render one blameless for accepting it.

With this in mind it is worthwhile to consider the moshol used by Rabbi Akiva to illustrate this idea (which I have not seen inside yet). It is related that a certain heretic approached Rabbi Akiva challenging him to demonstrate God’s existence. Rabbi Akiva replied by asking that the heretic demonstrate how his garment came into being. The analogy of a garment is particularly apt, since the purpose of a garment is to conceal. A person is both concealed by his garments, and identified with them as was the case with Yosef when he approached his brothers. Nature, creation, conceals the Creator while testifying to His existence.

On the one hand we should beware and recognize that while we can infer the Creator from creation, we can infer very little else. Knowledge of the Creator, His will and His attributes, cannot be attained by philosophical speculation but only Revelation. We might suppose certain things based on analogy from human intelligence but that is an exceedingly imperfect analogy (though perhaps more fruitful than a dogmatic agnosticism in absence of Revelation). Ultimately even Avrohom was dependant upon the “Master of the Mansion” revealing Himself and the Divrei Chaim on this parsha explains that had this not been the case even Avrohom Avinu would have been ensnared by the pitfalls of philosophical speculation חו״ש. We can rightly infer that there is a Creator of creation but we should not conflate that conclusion with evidence for a specific theological system (correct or not) since that is a matter of revelation and not philosophical enquiry.

On the other hand we must not engage in sophomoric attempts at denying this very basic inference from analogy. Again, analogies are often precarious things, and formalizing them begs us to analyze whether they are sound. But analogy is not either/or, it is a matter of judgment. It seems to me that when our initial instinct does not find it plausible that everything is the result of chance, as is the case with most people, this is a less biased analysis than an overly technical one which tries to find dissimilarities when in any other situation we would not conclude that something observed was merely the product of natural chance. We must refuse to find philosophical loopholes to avoid this obvious realization. We may not be able to find a philosophically sound definition of knowledge, by comparison, but that doesn’t mean we wouldn’t fail a lie detector test if we denied ‘knowledge’ of an event we had witnessed.

And we must beware, then, that we do not become presumptuous and dismiss this fundamental evidence for the Creator based on a mere “possibility” to the contrary. It is certainly a ploy of the yetzer hara for us to dismiss an argument found in the Rishonim, Geonim, Chazal, and the Nevi’im! One should know that to “believe” in something that one feels there is no reason to believe in is an impossibility. Such “belief” is fantasy and make-believe, one doesn’t believe, they wish it to be. That is not to say, חו״ש, that those who profess such a position are not believers. Indeed the descendants of Avrohom are “believers the sons of believers” and I recall hearing, in the name of one of the Rebbes from Ger I believe, that even when faced with doubt one must have emunah that one really has emunah. Rather an individual does have reason, correct or otherwise, to establish their emunah, but such a denial has a corrosive effect which will damage their emunah or even lead them or those they influence to a place of bitter waters ר״ל.

The path of Avrohom is, it seems to me, the path of Emunah Peshuta, an embrace of the simple recognition that creation has a Creator and embracing that the Creator has revealed Himself, to Avrohom through prophecy and to us through His Torah. One does not need to engage in endless enquiries in search of demonstrative proofs but recognize that we have sufficient reason to believe. Conversely emunah does not require that one does not ‘know” one’s belief is true, the Torah tells us that the B’nei Yisroel had faith in Hashem and Moshe even though they certainly “knew” as well, having witnessed open miracles and having attained prophecy. Rather we should not concede that it is even logically possible that the world not have a Creator. We should not pretend that we can believe in that which we deny reason to believe in, but we should neither pretend that our intellect is the final authority and is capable in finding all of the answer about the metaphysical realm.

[1] The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, Rav Sa’adia Gaon page 75 trans. Samuel Rosenblatt, Yale University Press.
[2] See page 110, 111
[3] 1:25, Metzudah page 3, 5.

Here Gosse Nothing...

One particularly obnoxious objection against resolving the age of the universe is the attempt to "pasul" it as a Christian idea since this was the approach that the Christian Philip Henry Gosse put for in his work Omphalos.

This is 1000% disingenuous.

Omphalos was, for better or for worse, DOA. It had little or no influence. My experience may be anecdotal but as someone who had an interest in Christian apologetics let me state clearly that I not once did I run into this line of reasoning being utilized by Christians to reconcile the Biblical account of creation with science.

In addition to the obvious ad hominem overtones, it is a fallacy of post hoc ergo proper hoc. While one might argue that one should not (or that traditionalist who take this approach teach that one should not) adopt non-Jewish religious teachings, there is clearly no prohibition against believing something because non-Jews believe it as well. With that in mind there is there is very little reason to believe that Omphalos played a role in this approach being introduced into the Jewish community.

It is not uncommon for two independent, or even competing, people to introduce theories which are, or are nearly, identical. I will spare you the cliche, but when confronted with a problem and given the same body of evidence it is not a novel thing for people to reach the same conclusion independently.

While Judaism does not accept the sola scriptura stance of traditional protestant Christianity, we have noted that it normally requires that a verses plain meaning be retained. Confronted with the same problem, namely the scientific evidence for a much much older universe, there are only so many possible solutions. From liberal allegorization to radical scepticism of science, one can find manifestations of each approach among either Jews or Christians but by far the "Gosse Theory" is the one I have found least likely to be expressed by Christians. I could almost exclude the instances I have encountered of Christians taking this approach to Gosse himself. An independent origin for this approach at reconciliation is as plausible, if not more, than that of borrowing.

This is reflected in my own experience. I had written on the "Gosse Theory", privately at least, before ever having heard the term. While I probably had heard generic assertions that God could create an old looking world, I had never seen this developed into a theory. It was a mere afterthought of those Christians who took a much more dismissive view of scientific opinion. I certainly never saw it argued that apparent age is a logical necessity from the text nor that it meant that one need not dismiss the Science behind evolution or the Big Bang.

In short it is ridiculous to object to an argument which seeks to establish the truth of Torah because it is accepted by Christians as well, especially when there is no evidence to support that the argument was actually adopted from Christians.

Parshas Noach: Evidence for a Global Flood?

When I was younger, much much younger, I had a plan. I and a couple of my friends where going to be missionaries. Well not just missionaries, we were going to “plant churches” all across the world, particularly in places such as along south Asia, roughly along the sailing route between California and the Middle East. And we were going to do it on a life size replica of Noah’s Ark, which would also serve as confirming evidence that a pair of each species could actually fit into the dimensions given by the Bible. And did I mention the part about underwater archeology in the Red Sea?

After being introduced to Judaism I found out that Razal had a much keener grasp of the obvious than I did at eleven (not that it doesn’t hold true now as well) noting that while the Biblical flood was an open miracle the ability for the Ark to fit all species was a more inconspicuous one.

While my dreams reflected an over active imagination and a degree of immaturity excusable for a child, the truth is that I’m not sure how rare the underlying fallacy of my reasoning is even among adults. My fundamental error was to approach a miracle as a natural phenomenon, or more specifically to try to apply naturalistic standards to a supernatural event. Without making a judgment on the possibility of miracles one can still say recognize that it is circular reasoning to falsify a miracle, or all miracles, because the do not conform to the laws of nature.

With the account of the Mabul, the flood of Noah, I see this reflected on either side of the spectrum. On the one hand in my life I have chanced upon unknown numbers media pieces on “evidence” of Noah’s flood whether it is Christian apologetic material or pop television specials which provide a fuzzy and inaccurate blend of traditional and academic. In addition to the aforementioned problem these specials seem to be significantly chronologically challenged, though their primary audience is probably not so concerned with such details.

On the other hand we have those who, in the face of a lack of evidence for such a global flood, conclude that this account [also] must be considered allegorical. While my overriding discomfort of removing a passage from its simple meaning without textual basis has already been noted and supported, R. Harry Maryles of Haemtza once noted that his mentor HaRav Aaron Soloveitchik zt’l considered the allegorization of the Mabul to be kefirah (or was it only almost kefirah?). While I can only speculate, I would speculate that it was not that the Mabul was so significant but more that to allegorize such a major Biblical account without any textual or traditional basis would undermine the entire pshat of the Chumash. Perhaps it is not so much that allegorization to the exclusion of the pshat is a slippery slope, but rather more of a sudden drop off after B’reshis -- where at least the ambiguity of the meaning of “day” prior to the creation of the sun etc. provided basis for a second look.

When I was younger, yes about the same age I was earlier in the piece, the river bed down stream was about four or five times the size of the river itself for a certain stretch. Sticking up from the gravel where a number of dead trees. Their blackened trunks lacked any real branches to speak of. Initially I had always assumed that they had burnt in the fires of 1987, just prior to my moving there. Only later did I find out that they had been killed by flood (again, had my grasp of the obvious been keener I would have realized that for trees to burn at the very bottom of the valley would require that the fire travel farther down the mountain than the remaining trees would suggest that it had).

According to chapter 8 verse 11, Noah new that the waters had receded when the dove returned with an olive leaf in its beak. This olive tree was underwater for a much longer period of time than those trees in the valley had been, and it was submerged! Yet Noah’s dove was able to bring back an olive leaf, an image which today is associated with peace. But unlike the flooding of the river back home which was a natural occurrence there is not pretence of nature with respect to the Mabul. To infer effects of the Mabul from the effects of a natural flood is fundamentally a poor analogy. While a miracle would affect the natural, since that is the stage upon which it takes place, the effect can only be recognized by observation not inference. I can assure you that people throughout the ages have seen the effects of natural floods but I doubt that any of them experienced a crisis of faith because the read that the dove found an olive branch on a tree that spent months underwater.

Very briefly, some wish to argue in favor of a limited/local flood. To support this they reference the midrash which says that Eretz Yisroel wasn’t included in the Mabul. Of course the most obvious question is since when to we treat the midrash as “historical” and uproot the Pshat? Second of all, this is basically equivocation. The midrash speaks of a “limited” Mabul insofar as it was limited to places other than Eretz Yisroel but it is still a global flood. The Midrash doesn’t negate that where it not for Noah and the Ark the flood would have left man and animal kind extinct.

Because to dan l'kaf chov is a lack of "Derech Eretz"

This is adapted from a comment made on the post at the Divrei Chaim Blog hachanos for mitzvos - how NOT to buy an esrog or build a sukkah.

I too would like to see an increased appreciation for derech eretz as it applies in our general culture. There are, however a couple of points which I think need to be recognized.

In the 1950's there was an occurrence of mass hysteria known as The Seattle Windshield Pitting Epidemic. People, it would seem, started "looking at their window" rather than "through them" and noticed the typical cracks caused by small rocks and the like, and attributed them to nefarious causes. The human mind can be very selective in what it notices, and susceptible to suggestion as well. A caricature of Frum Yidden having poor manners is going to make it much more likely that confirming examples will be noticed, whether out of antagonism or a sense that it reflects poorly on the observer as well. I would argue that had the situation been reversed it is not anywhere near as likely that it would have been noticed as reflecting well on the son. This isn't a criticism, it is just natural.

Secondly, I have worked in customer service, both Jewish and general, and I can tell you that even in the general culture, among affluent educated people, it is often that common courtesy is observed in the breach. I can also tell you that while I have not had a lot of interaction with the larger "Frum" world my experience has been that they may often not be as "sociable", but among my Jewish customers they have not generally been the one's who have caused a scene. Yes, this is very anecdotal but it is my experience.

Finally derech eretz is subjective. I have a non-Jewish coworker of European birth who finds our affinity about such customs as saying please and thank you as being phony and insincere. When you are purchasing from someone you are doing them a favor. Of course in such a case as this they are also doing you a favor by providing something you need. I see nothing wrong if in a particular culture please and thank you are reserved for less casual interactions. In the end the merchant set up shop to make money.

But I still tell my coworker to use please and thank you to those in his charge because when and where it is customary to do so it is rude not to regardless.

Thanks, :)