Critique of Rabbi Jeremy Wieder's "When the Torah Doesn't Mean What it Says"

It is by no means a secret that allegorical interpretation plays a central role in traditional Jewish belief. Nor is it some obscure fact that allegorical interpretation was used as a way to confront conflicts between Judaism and science/philosophy by major Jewish authorities such as the Rambam. It is therefore natural that the use of allegorical interpretation will be explored as an option for approaching the difficulties presented by modern science such as evolution and the age of the Universe. It is precisely this that Rabbi Jeremy Wieder shlita does in his lecture “When the Torah Doesn’t Mean What it Says: Non-Literal Interpretation of Scripture and the Controversy over the Works of Nosson Slifkin.”[1]

Rabbi Wieder begins by making several very important distinctions. He notes that discussion of non-literal interpretation pertains specifically to supplanting the simple meaning of the text, not supplementing it. He also notes that idiomatic language is a separate issue which falls under the category of the simple meaning of the text. He explains that pshat, the simple meaning of the text, is best understood as the meaning which would be apparent to its initial audience. While each of these points is significant, the relevance in several of the sources discussed was not explored.

Prior to delving into sources which deal directly with the question of when and if it is permissible to allegorically interpret scripture, to the exclusion of its simple meaning, Rabbi Wieder discusses whether there are any Talmudic sources which would be relevant. In anticipation of those who might suggest the statement of Chazal that “אֵין מִקְרָא יוֹצֵא מִידֵי פְּשׁוּטוֹ” (Yevamos 24a and elsewhere) would provide such a source, Rabbi Wieder argues that while the later authorities had a “literalist preference” they did not frame it as based on this concept. This argument is reminiscent of Rabbi Wieder’s warning later that, “I don’t want to be sort of glib in using this line but I like to quote this because it’s 95% true, which is: ‘absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.’” As we will see, despite caveats about when allegorical interpretation is permissible, the literal approach is not simply a preference but an imperative. While sources are not cited, the otherwise obligatory nature of literal interpretation is taken as an established principle, and “אֵין מִקְרָא יוֹצֵא מִידֵי פְּשׁוּטוֹ” provides the most obvious and direct statement of such a concept.[Subsequently I have found secondary sources which cite a Gaon who identified this Chazal as the source for Saadia Gaon's position, as well as other relevant information...]

The first source explored, rightly so I believe, was the opinion of Saadia Gaon found in Emunos v’Deos 7:2. But although this passage cited is directly relevant, I believe the presentation of the Gaon’s position was incomplete and understated. The Gaon was very much an opponent of allegorizing scripture. While Rabbi Wieder almost takes it for granted that halachic passages not be taken allegorically, the Gaon sees this as a very real potential risk once allegorical interpretation is allowed to replace the simple meaning, and its application to narratives is an additional concern, “if this kind of interpretation is necessary for the legal section of Scripture, it must likewise apply to the narrative portion.” (E.D. 7:4).[2] Although Rabbi Wieder’s presentation of the Gaon’s position as representing when one must interpret allegorically is technically correct, in truth it was brought as exceptions to the general rule that “it is a well known fact that every statement found in the Bible is to be understood in its literal sense.” (E.D. 7:2, page 265).

Of the four exceptions to what amounts to a prohibition against allegorical interpretation removing the simple meaning, Rav Wieder correctly points out that the latter two involve resolving internal conflicts in Scripture and are not entirely relevant to our discussion. The other two are instances where Scripture cannot be understood according to its simple meaning since to do so conflicts with the observation of our senses or reason. It is noteworthy that Saadia Gaon’s language (as well as some of the examples he discusses in light of the philosophical debates surrounding them) implies a mere difficulty is insufficient but the observation or logic must be mutually exclusive with the simple meaning. Even if one does not wish to take his words so strictly it would seem that the Gaon would not be comfortable with an allegorical approach except as a last resort.

It is interesting to note that either example given for when one may/must interpret allegorically because of conflict with observation or reason can be understood as included in those categories which Rabbi Wieder correctly excluded from the parameters of the discussion in his introduction. The equivocal language of Genesis 3:20 where Eve is called the “Mother of all Living” was certainly not understood by its original audience as indicating all living species descended from Eve, and this is made clear by the context. Likewise the description of God as a “devouring fire” found in Deuteronomy 4:24 is a more or less clear example of figurative speech and would have been understood as such by its original audience.

While the position of Saadia Gaon might be called understated, in a way the position of the Rambam is overstated. Rabbi Wieder notes that the Rambam distinguished between two competing theories, both of which claimed that the Universe had always existed. Arguing that if necessary he could interpret the passages which imply the Universe had been created allegorically, the Rambam said he did not feel compelled to do so since the theory of Plato was not convincing. With respect to the theory of Aristotle; however, the Rambam conceded that allegorical interpretation would not be fruitful since accepting it would be to affirm the impossibility of miracles which would entirely undermine Judaism. It is here that Rabbi Wieder seems to overstate the Rambam’s position, asserting that the Rambam would reject the heretical but otherwise compelling view of Aristotle in favor of the simple meaning of the text. This does not, however, appear to be the Rambam’s position. The Rambam wrote, “If, on the other hand, Aristotle had a proof for his theory, the whole teaching of Scripture would be rejected, and we should be forced to other opinions.” (Moreh Nevuchim 2:25).[3] To the Rambam, Aristotle’s theory regarding the eternity of the Universe and Judaism were mutually exclusive and to prove the former meant that the latter was falsified. While this may seem bold, the Rambam is clearly speaking hypothetically in a manner similar to that found in the first chapter of Yesodei HaTorah. Rambam certainly felt there the evidence did not support Aristotle’s view but he didn’t hesitate to make it clear that had it been correct allegorical interpretation would not have helped, the positions were mutually exclusive. Indeed if we were to assume that he meant to simply turn a blind eye had the evidence been convincing it is curious why he would refuse to minimize the conflict by an otherwise possible allegorical interpretation. If the universe had been demonstrated to be eternal, then allegorical interpretation would be every bit as useful with respect to the primary issue as it would be with Plato’s theory, even if in the end the secondary issues were irreconcilable.

Either way, we see that the Rambam concedes that regarding fundamental principles allegorical interpretation is ineffective at resolving such conflicts. Rabbi Wieder suggest that Saadia Gaon would have essentially agreed, “So the Rambam in effect accepts Saadia’s position, although he adds the modification, I’m not sure that Saadia Gaon would have disagreed, that if there is a conflict with some fundamental principle of Torah, then you cannot reinterpret Scripture.” In truth we do not need to speculate about Saadia Gaon’s position because although it is true that he does not address the issue when listing the exceptions to the prohibition against allegorical interpretation, he makes it clear that through inappropriate allegorical interpretation one can exclude “oneself from the entire Jewish religion.” (E.D. page 426).[4]

It does not seem to me accurate, however, to equate the Rambam’s position with Saadia Gaon’s, even with the recognition that the Rambam would also concede that allegorical interpretation has limits to its effectiveness. Saadia Gaon’s threshold for allegorical interpretation seems higher. The Rambam’s standard seems to be one of “compelling” evidence while the position of Saadia Gaon is that allegorical interpretation is only acceptable when the passage “cannot be so construed” (E.D. page 265). While the general tone of Saadia Gaon’s position (which we will explore more below) would suggest that he means this strictly, that only demonstrative proof contrary to the simple meaning is sufficient, even if one understands his position more liberally it appears to be a higher threshold than that found in the Moreh Nevuchim.

Conversely, the Rambam’s approach to allegorical interpretation when his lower threshold has not been met is also somewhat understated. Rabbi Wieder says:

[A]nd in the absence of compelling logic, in the Hebrew terms as it was translated hisboer b’mofeis [התבאר במופת, M.N. II:25], in the absence of compelling logic one opts to interpret haMikra k’peshuto, like Saadia Gaon in effect said, what we call the ‘literalist preference’ ….but because Plato didn’t prove his view, the Rambam says he doesn’t really feel any need to reinterpret scripture.

The Rambam’s position is really stronger than not feeling “any need” or a “literalist preferences. When one is not compelled to do so, one is not allowed to interpret allegorically to the exclusion of the simple meaning, “a mere argument in favour of a certain theory is not sufficient reason for rejecting the literal meaning of a Biblical text.” (M.N. II:25).[5] In the absence of being compelled otherwise, “we take the Bible literally” (ibid).

Regarding the Rashba, Rabbi Wieder presents his opinion as similar, albeit more conservative to those of Saadia Gaon and the Rambam. In truth the source[6] discussed by Rabbi Wieder would imply that in instances where allegorical interpretation is conceivable according to the Rashba then his threshold for permitting one to do so may be even lower that that of the Rambam. While Saadia Gaon reserves allegorical interpretation for when observation or reason prevents one from accepting the simple meaning, and the Rambam rejects allegorical interpretation when there is an equally plausible explanation which preserves the simple meaning, the Rashba seems to allow allegorical interpretation to uproot the simple meaning of the text whenever one is confronted with a conflict with “science”, as Rabbi Wieder quotes, “If any one of our Chachmei HaTorah finds something in philosophy which he believes to be correct and then when he reaches pesukim that seem to teach the opposite he explains them in such a way that fits with the philosophical investigation and he interprets Scripture non-literally.”[7]

Nevertheless it is not difficult to understand Rabbi Wieder’s portrayal of the Rashba as more conservative. In addition to the relative liberalness which we have suggested being obscured by a de-emphasis of Saadia Gaon and Rambam’s reservations about allegorical interpretation, the Rashba’s general position is overshadowed by a more expansive category of cases which cannot be allegorically interpreted. The Rashba contends that when a scientific position conflicts with a tradition (kabalah) we follow the tradition and do not interpret the passage allegorically.[8] While Rabbi Wieder seems to equate the notion of a “tradition” with the “Yesodei Emunah”, corresponding to his description of Saadia Gaon and the Rambam, in the question and answer period after the lecture he concedes that the Rashba’s position was much broader. Indeed the Rashba’s opinion that any position in tradition which was accepted generally by the Jewish people should be accepted even in the face of conflicting scientific opinion.

While it is perhaps fair to assume, without evidence otherwise, that the position of the Ramban was similar to that of his disciple the Rashba, the example cited does not seem entirely relevant. In his commentary to parshas Noach the Ramban argues that we are forced to accept the position of the Greeks that a rainbow is caused by light passing through the rain since we can observe the same phenomenon by holding a glass of water to the light. It is significant, and alluded to by Rabbi Wieder, that the Ramban does not use this information to offer an allegorical interpretation but makes a grammatical argument that the simple meaning of the text was that the rainbow had been made previously but was given a symbolic meaning after the flood. There is little, if any, that we can really infer from this about the Ramban’s willingness to interpret allegorically.

Likewise, Rabbi Wieder’s mention of the Tosefos’ acceptance of the opinion that the sun went above the sky at night (despite the Gemara’s apparent rejection of that opinion in favor of the view of the non-Jewish scholars) served no real purpose that to undermine the distinction he tried to make several times that religion deals with theological/ethical questions while science deals with the physical. It is difficult to understand why a modern philosophical approach to the division of labor between religion and science can in and of itself serve as reconciliation between the two when one encroaches into the territory designated to the other. And while passages which deal with the opinion of the Chachmei Ashkenaz on this topic may be allusive, it might have been instructive investigate their general approach to studying Greek philosophy. For better or worse it essentially represented “mainstream” scientific opinion, and analyzing their approach would indirectly illuminate their view on our topic to a degree. In other words, while the Rambam may have rejected the opinion of Aristotle or Plato when he did not find their proofs convincing, it may be relevant to consider those authorities who rejected their opinions/approach despite their proofs.

I do not think it would be entirely unfair to accuse my remarks this far as being somewhat “nit-picking”. I would still maintain that they are justified since while the distinctions I draw between Rabbi Wieder’s presentation and what I feel are the actual views of the Rishonim he cites may seem small, in application there is a great divergence between what Rabbi Wieder views as acceptable allegorical interpretation and what these authorities find acceptable. Rabbi Weider argues, "I think it becomes pretty clear that unless either of these theories, or either of these issues, would conflict with one of the ikkarei haemunah there is simply no problem by definition, because anything that doesn't come into conflict, any passage which doesn't touch upon ikkarei emunah, can simply be reinterpreted in a fashion of mashal." Rather than a difficult, if necessary, solution to a philosophical dilemma, allegorical interpretation becomes a magic wand which erases any conflict between Torah narrative and contemporary scientific/historical understanding. A step taken by the Rishonim with an abudance of caution is presented as an easy alternative.

Rabbi Wieder rules out the possibility of allegorically interpreting Matan Torah, the giving of the Torah, correctly noting that it is among the most fundamental of the fundamentals. Regarding allegorically interpreting Yitziyas Mitzrayim, the Exodus from Egypt, he expresses some reservations about saying it is forbidden categorically but argues that it is “safek heresy” since whatever would cause one to interpret Yitziyas Mitzrayim allegorically would logically compel one to do so with Matan Torah. This is what I would call “avak kefirah,” the dust of heresy. An idea may not in and of itself infringe upon a fundamental principle but if one follows such logic to its conclusion it would infringe upon a fundamental principle.

Rabbi Wiider continues to suggest hypothetically that it would be permissible interpret the existence of the Avos allegorically. Here, I believe we can say with certainty that based on what we have seen the Rashba would view this as contrary to our mesorah and reject allegorical interpretation. Furthermore, in a letter included in Minchas Kenaos,[9] of which the Rashba is a signatory, he specifically objects to an opinion which viewed the Patriarchs as allegorical symbols. Nor do I think that it is entirely clear that Saadia Gaon would not include such an approach in the category of one who “excludes oneself from the entire Jewish religion.” Saadia Gaon was very cognizant that allegorical interpretation could unravel the fabric of the Jewish faith and it would be very difficult to reconcile his criticism of allegorical interpretation with applying such an approach to the Patriarchs. The Ramban in is commentary on the Torah criticizes the Rambam (which is cited with approval by the Ribash[10]) for saying that certain encounters with angels which the Patriarch’s experienced had really occurred in dreams. If the Ramban objected to what amounts to a slight modification of how a handful of events in the lives of the Patriarchs transpired then it is hard to imagine that he would find interpreting allegorically their entire lives palatable. Of all the authorities mentioned it would seem most likely that the Rambam would countenance such an approach, but I think we will see it is not at all clear that he would.

Based on his presentation of the opinion of the Rishonim, and the strength of the scientific evidence, Rabbi Wieder takes it as obvious that an allegorical interpretation of the opening chapters of Genesis is both permissible and necessary, and then proceeds to discuss whether one may theoretically interpret the accounts between Creation and the Patriarchs allegorically. While it is not immediately clear why we should find it more difficult to interpret these generations allegorically than those of the Patriarchs, his glossing over propriety of interpreting the Creation account allegorically strikes me as premature.

Again the Rambam is clearly the best source to justify interpreting the Creation account allegorically since he does precisely this in the Moreh Nevuchim. It is still far from clear that that the Rambam can be cited as an authority that would support allegorizing. He writes, “First, the account given in Scripture of the Creation is not, as is generally believed, intended to be in all its parts literal.” (ibid, page 211). While it is quite correct to note that he accepts allegorizing the Creation account (perhaps entirely for all practical purposes) it must be recognized that he does not do so to the whole account indiscriminately. Furthermore in suggesting the relevance of those very chapters between the Creation and the Patriarch’s, the Rambam writes, “It is one of the fundamental principles of the Law that the Universe has been created ex nihilo, and that of the human race, one individual being, Adam, was created.” (M.N. III:50, page 381). While it may not constitute one of the “13 Fundamental Principles of Faith” it is nevertheless a “fundamental principle of the Torah” that mankind descended from Adam similar to Creation ex nihilo.[11] About such principles the Rambam had already written,

I mention this lest you be deceived; for a person might some day, by some objection which he raises, shake your belief in the theory of the Creation, and then easily mislead you; you would then adopt the theory [of the Eternity of the Universe] which is contrary to the fundamental principles of our religion, and leads to ‘speaking words that turn away from God.’ You must rather have suspicion against your own reason, and accept the theory taught by two prophets who have laid the foundation for the existing order in the religious and social relations of mankind. Only demonstrative proof should be able to make you abandon the theory of the Creation; but such a proof does not exist in nature. (M.N. 2:23, page 195, italic mine).

Common decent from Adam would appear to be included in this latter category by the Rambam, which means that without deductive proof it is not appropriate to interpret this account (Adam HaRishon as the founder of the human race) allegorically. The science which would conflict with this notion is inductive by nature, so it would seem that “such a proof does not exist in nature” in this case as well. That is not to suggest, by any means, that the inductive evidence is lacking in any way, it means that we have to exercise epistemological modesty, “have suspicion against your own reason” and recognize that induction of even the highest caliber does not trump Divine testimony.

The Rambam’s position might nevertheless allow one to interpret those aspects of the Creation prior to Adam allegorically, although it is not at all clear to me how one could reach a reconciliation with the details of evolution without utilizing other approaches which themselves would provide a less problematic way of addressing the conflict at large, doing so does not seem to be an option according to Saadia Gaon: “The result of the application of such a method of interpretation would be that there would not be an item left of the entire story of the creation [of the world] that would not be divested of its literal meaning, which is the creation and origination of things.” (E.D. page 425). It is significant to note that despite things which are difficult to relate to, such as evening and morning prior to the existence of the sun, Saadia Gaon felt that the primary message being conveyed is the actual origin of the Universe, and he found interpreting it entirely allegorically is an absurd option, the bottom of the “slippery slope”. Indeed it is with regard to taking such an approach to its logical conclusion with respect to the creation of the world and the commandments that he wrote, “if one adopts such an attitude, one automatically excludes oneself from the entire Jewish religion” (E.D. page 426).

We have already discussed that the Rashba’s position about when we are not allowed to allegorically interpret a passage is a broad one and it would seem from the question and answer session that the Rashba actually rejects allegorical interpretation which would reject the traditional understanding of when the world was created. There is another Rishon who took somewhat of an opposing position to the Rashba in the controversy which led him to elaborate on this topic, the Meiri. The Meiri has three classifications of Scripture with respect to allegorical interpretation, those which must be interpreted only allegorically, those which can have an additional allegorical meaning, and those which may not be interpreted allegorically at all. The Meiri includes the creation of the world in the latter category which is forbidden to interpret allegorically.[12] And it is interesting to note that while Rabbi Wieder says he doesn’t like the term allegory because of its Christian connotation, both the Meiri and the Rashba draw unfavorable parallels between Jewish allegorists and Christian interpretation[13], and irony only highlighted by the fact that he refuses to use his preferred translation (“Myth”) because of even worse connotation.

Also lacking was a discussion of the logic behind such an approach. Rabbi Wieder said, “if there were no geological evidence otherwise… I then probably would read the story of B’reishis as historical.” Why is it that when presented with conflicting evidence one should interpret allegorically rather than reject the account? Why is this more “intellectually honest” than to let the question stand or otherwise ignore the contradictory evidence. While it is true that a pliable approach which allows for liberal allegorical interpretation makes a belief system less vulnerable to contradiction, less falsifiable, this does not make it more reasonable. Each account which is allegorized, simply because it seems false otherwise, tests one’s credulity. I do believe that the case can be made to justify allegorical interpretation as a mean for reconciling conflicts with science. But to do so we must consider Torah as a rationally defensible truth which must be taken into account when weighing the various issues. It seems to me, however, that those who are most inclined towards the “rationalist” position today are the least likely to appreciate attempts to use reason to establish the Divine Revelation of the Torah.

Rabbi Wieder’s presentation is a polemic one. In light of the controversy which precipitated it, it is understandable that those who share his approach would seek to encourage themselves by focusing on the strengths of their position, real or perceived. But more than a somewhat one-sided pep-talk, Rabbi Wieder systematically dismissed the more conservative position as essentially baseless while glossing over significant sources from the same authorities which would suggest much more hesitancy about allegorical interpretation. There may certainly be room to debate how far each authority would go and under what circumstances, but there is no doubt that they found allegorical interpretation which replaced the simple meaning of the text to be an exception and exceptional. Insofar as there are other approaches to reconciling science with Torah which can be utilized, alone or in combination, it does not seem at all clear that allegorical interpretation is an appropriate route. And while I can understand that others will disagree and find the allegorical approach “better” it should not be debatable that allegorical interpretation is something that should be undertaken with an abundance of caution and the greatest possible effort to maintain the simple meaning of the text.

[1] http://zootorah.com/controversy/RavWieder.mp3
[2]Saadia Gaon, The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, translated by Samuel Rosenblatt, page 272-3, Yale Press. All translations and page numbers refer to this edition.
[3] Rabbi Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed, page 200, translated M. Friedlander, Dover Publications, Inc. All translations and page numbers refer to this edition.
[4] From 7:5 of the variant used in the Ibn Tibbon Hebrew translation of Emunos v’Deos Treatise 7.
[5] Guide, page 199.
[6] While Rabbi Wieder’s source would seem to be Sheilos u’Teshuvos HaRashba vol. 1:9 it is included almost verbatim in the Chidushei HaRashba, Perushei HaHagados on Bava Basra 74:b
[7] See Chidushei HaRashba, Perushei HaHagados, Mosad HaRav Kook edition page 102.
[8] Ibid page 104.
[9] See Interpretation and Allegory: Antiquity to the Modern Period, Patricia Lee Gauch and Jon Whitman, page 197. Brill, 2003.
[10] See Menachem Kellner’s translation, Rabbi Isaac Bar Sheshet’s Responsum Concerning the Study of Greek Philosophy, Tradition Vol. 15 (Fall 1975), pages 110-118.
[11] Relevant to the permissibility of interpreting the Exodus from Egypt allegorically, the Rambam classifies this as a “fundamental principle” as well (page 346).
[12] Beis HaBechira 3:11, cited in Interpretation and Allegory, page 205.
[13] See Interpretation and Allegory, page 198.

Ferliihcin Prium

Chvraiem, Rsbaoai,

I jsut wnaetd to tkae the tmie to wsih you and yruos a filrichen Pruim and to amdinsoh you to awayls be smaech rsepnisloby.

Stalin and Purim

(Last year I posted the following comment [which I have edited very little] at Cross-Currents:)

Other times, the Adar coincidences are more obviously meaningful, clearly linked to Purim. A few Adars ago, a striking irony emerged from a new book about Joseph Stalin. http://www.cross-currents.com/archives/2008/03/14/accidents-dont-happen/#comment-363773

Well I had heard this before but felt like I should do a little research to try to confirm it, not to second guess Rabbi Shafran but… At first the only date which seemed to pop up was the 5th of March, the day he actually died, but then:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2793501.stm

The night of 28 February began in the usual manner for Stalin and his closest political circle, Lavrenty Beria, Nikita Khrushchev, Nikolai Bulganin and Georgi Malenkov. They watched a film in the Kremlin then retired to Stalin’s country home, 10 minutes outside Moscow, for yet another night of feasting. By the early hours of 1 March, Stalin’s guests had gone back to their homes in Moscow…..The guards began to get worried, but no one dared to go into his rooms. They had no right to disturb Stalin unless invited into his presence personally. At 6.30 a light came on in Stalin’s rooms, and the guards relaxed a little. But by the time 10 o’clock had chimed they were petrified. Lozgachev was finally sent in to check on Stalin…..The guards rushed to call Stalin’s drinking companions, the Politburo.

And from the Library of Congress website:

Stalin collapsed on March 1, 1953, and remained unconscious until he died on March 5. Khrushchev said he didn’t receive immediate medical care because Stalin’s advisers at first thought he was drunk and would regain consciousness. “He was on the floor and they brought him [up] on the sofa,” said Khrushchev. http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/0304/post-stalin.html

It does appear that Stalin “began” dying on March 1st after a drinking party, and it seems that March first that year was in fact Purim:
http://www.hebcal.com/converter/?gd=1&gm=3&gy=1953&g2h=Compute+Hebrew+Date&hd=10&hm=Adar2&hy=5768
Viewed through the lens of emunah we can see the hashgacha.


***After scheduling this to appear a few days later to give more time for the prior post, it occurred to me that I scheduled it to appear on March 1, the 56th anniversary of the events in the post on the solar calendar. 

(Minor Edits 2/22/18)

Moshav Leitzim

Previously, at asimplejew.blogspot.com I had a back and forth with Reb Chabakuk Elisha about the permissibility of attending sporting events, or other similar venues for entertainment. I would like to take the opportunity to revisit the topic a [very] little more systematically.

Those of you who may remember the earlier discussion should know that there was a source I was keeping silent about. In addition to seeming at such odds with the other sources as I understand them, I was unable to actually read the source:

Divrei Chachamim 5:42

Question: If it is permitted to go to a קרקס, circus, theatre, etc, because of the prohibition of “do not rejoice, Israel, in jubilations like the nations” (as is written in Mishneh Berurah 301:59)?

Response: Rav Chaim Pinchas Scheinberg shlita ruled that nowadays it is permitted since the prohibition was only relevant when their culture was contrary to the Jewish faith”

It would seem that Rav Sheinberg shlita allows one to go to a baseball game or so forth (In Heart to Heart Talks it is recorded that he instructed mothers to allow their children to go to amusements parks, but I believe the issues are a little different). Rav Sheinberg reviewed the psak's brought in his name in the Divrei Chachamim so we can trust that this reflects his opinion, but it is the nature of the work that we are not told his full line of reasoning. I'm not sure that Rav Sheinberg would consider a football game or boxing match to be in the category of entertainment which is not "contrary to the Jewish faith." Indeed the violent aggression in tackle football or boxing is enough that I'm not certain one is allowed to play them, i.e. the issue is even more than that of moshav leitzim. Nevertheless it seems to me that Rav Sheinberg's position does not appear to be shared by other Gedolei HaPoskim of our lifetime and is difficult to square with the earlier sources:

T’hillim 1:1

“The praises of a man are that he did not follow the counsel of the wicked, neither did he stand in the way of sinners nor sit in the company of scorners.”

Rashi on T’hillim 1:2

“But his desire is in the law of the Lord”—Hence you learn that the [trait of the] company of scorners brings one to neglect of the study of Torah.”

From this Rashi it would seem that Moshav Leitzim, a "company of scorners", is an issue not because of specifically unkosher activities, even bitul Torah, but because it produces bitul Torah as a habit.

Based on the Gemara in Avodah Zarah 18b this concept is brought down in the halachah:

Magen Avraham 307:22

“Because of the prohibition against participation in a gathering of scoffers.” And this is the ruling for one who goes to theaters and circuses which are places of amusement as stated in Avodah Zarah 18b and places of pastime….”

Chayei Adam Hilchos T’fillah u’Brachos 63:17

“The Bach wrote in the name of Sefer HaEshkol [to guard yourself from seeing?] hunts of the gentiles, and this is the ruling for their dances or any type of their celebrations. And if you hear the sound of gentile feasting or rejoicing, lament and grieve over the destruction of Jerusalem, and pray to the Holy One blessed be He about this. And about this it is said, “Do not rejoice, Israel, like the exultations of the peoples.” [Hosea 9:1, adapted from Stone Edition Tanach]. Additionally there is with all of this [a prohibition of participating in a] “gathering of scoffers”, and even if it is [held by] Jews. And Chazal said in tractate Avodah Zarah (18a) “Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi expounded, ‘Happy is the man who does not walk in the counsel of the wicked’ (T’hillim 1:1) this is one who walks to theaters and to circuses (Rashi explains, ‘a palace, and anything when they gather to laugh and scoff.’) ‘And in the path of sinners he does not stand’ (ibid), this is one who doesn’t stand in hunts (Rashi explains, ‘trapping wild animals by means of dogs and any action of their done for laughter or rejoicing.’) ‘And in a gathering of scoffers he does not sit.’ (ibid) he does not sit in their councils.” .....

Mishneh Berurah 307:59 (Translation from the Feldheim Edition)

“Because of the prohibition against participation in a gathering of scoffers.” One certainly transgress this prohibition if he goes to theaters and circuses [which are places of amusement [שְׂחוֹק] as stated in Avodah Zarah, 18b] or participates in other pastimes. Even on Purim, only merriment that is intended to remind one of the miracles that occurred in the time of Achashveirosh is permitted [M.A.] Nowadays, because of our many sins, some people are completely unrestrained in this matter and go to theaters, despite the fact that Scripture cries out saying, “do not rejoice, Israel, in jubilations.” (Hosheya 9:1) One also transgresses the prohibition against inciting one’s evil inclination if he goes there, and our Sages of blessed memory said, “Whoever scoffs, falls into Geyhinnom, as it is written, etc., and suffers afflictions even in this world, as it is written, ‘and now, do not scoff, lest your afflictions become heavier.” [See additional sayings and quotations regarding this matter in the Gemara there.]

Aruch HaShulchan 307:9

“And this is the ruling for one who goes to theaters and circuses which are places of amusement and pastime.”

It is difficult to say that there is any inherent difference between the theater today and the theater in the days of the Magen Avraham or the Mishneh Berurah which would be come out in favor of theaters today. Certainly modern theaters routinely display scenes which would not have been acceptable even to non-Jews of that era. And while my translation skills aren't the best but it seems that the Aruch HaShulchan agrees that this prohibition applies to contemporary theaters and not merely those which featured gladiators and the like. Furthermore we must remember that there seems to be a concern about habituation of bitul Torah.

Igros Moshe O.C. 2:95

“And on the matter of entering a theater or movies, behold, it is something forbidden, and how is it relevant to permit removing one’s hat and being bare headed for it? He adds sin on top of his sin. And if the question is about one who is seized by his inclination to go there, and will not listen to not going, perhaps it is good that he remove his hat so that there will not be a chilul Hashem, since they will not know he is a Torah observant Jew. This is a great reason but only if intended l’shem shemayim. However since it is implausible to say that one seized by the inclination actually has intent l’shem shamaym, rather to belittle the matter even further with uncovering his head, therefore there is nothing to permit it.”

Not only does he apply the prohibition to contemporary theaters, he applies it to sports stadiums:

Igros Moshe Y.D. 4 simon 11

"However when there is a reason for doing so such as with theaters and [circus?], which are [mentioned] in Avodah Zarah 18b, which are leitzanus, there isn't an issue of avodah zarah, even though it is prohibited on the side of leitzanus, and all that go there transgress the prohibition of moshav leitzim and bitul Torah--not only at this moment-- but he will be caused to completely neglect Torah as explained there. And all the more so with the theaters found now in our lands, and so with sports arenas."

And bearing the involvement of Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach zt'l (particularly in the footnotes) with Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasa it is significant that Chapter 16 footnote 25 applies the above Mishneh Berurah to attending sporting events on the weekdays. One should also note Shulchan Shlomo 307:26 which indicates those things classified moshav leitzim were prohibited because of bitul Torah.

Likewise we find that the prohibition applies when it is under "Jewish" auspices:

Mishneh Berurah 224:3

“It is stated in the Gemara that it is even prohibited to go to a Jewish hunt or theater, since this is equivalent to participation in a gathering of scoffers.”

This is also the ruling of the Magen Avraham 224:3, further emphasizing that the concerns where not bloodshed, idolatry, or pritzus per se.

Now, we all know that we need to relax, each according to his or her need. Moshav Leitzim does not apply to just any recreation. According to HaRav Ovadia Yosef shlita going to the Zoo, for example, is permitted. What is the difference if it is not the content which we are concerned about?

Note the diagram at the top of the post which illustrates they dynamics of watching a sporting event. The same is true of attending theater or a circus. It is a collective experience where the audience passively fixate on a central display of entertainment. It is the group aspect of the event which seems to be most problematic since it means that the event is dictating when you will refrain from learning Torah, not your own need to relax, and your decision to refrain from learning is ratified by the excitement of the crowd.

Going to the Zoo, or park, camping, hiking, biking, etc. there is no such central focus. You choose your own adventure, generally on your own terms.

This is, it seems to me, one aspect of problematic "entertainment" in contrast with needed "relaxation".

Other activities, more private ones, present issues of Moshav Leitzim too. Certain literature is prohibited by the Shulchan Aruch in OC 307 and although the Rama is lenient may authorities include playing Chess and "similar" games in the prohibition of Moshav Leitzim. In these instances it would seem that the problem is more of an issue of the amount of time needed involvement in such activities (such as learning the otherwise useless rules).

Now of course there is the famous:

Avos 3:3

“Rabbi Chanina ben Tradyon says: If two sit together and there are no words of Torah between them, it is a [gathering of scoffers], as it is said ‘In the [gathering of scoffers] he does not sit.” (Thillim 1:1).”

It would seem that when the activity isn't merely passive entertainment, but has a ruchnius quality, then the prohibition of Moshav Leitzim does not apply. This would seem to include a cheder play or a religious concert. Perhaps, just perhaps, this might be part of the consideration in reports of major Yeshivos taking their talmidim to ball games. While it could be argued that it might be misleading as to what the halachah is, it may be that the Rebbeim reckoned that such an outing in the "Yeshiva" context would give chizuk to boys who might otherwise have found it difficult to dedicate themselves to learning Torah and therefore in such a case it would lead more learning Torah rather than less. The talmidim get needed relaxation, albeit when they are told to relax, while bonding with other talmidim. I'm not so certain that it is the best line of reasoning, or the one utilized, but one could make a case...

Which brings me to the next point, that it may not be the best thing to bring this topic up. Regarding playing chess for gain the Rama (O.C. 338:5) says: Nevertheless, one should not protest to women and children who play for gain, since in view of the fact they will not heed us it is preferable that they transgress be-shogeyg (in ignorance of the fact that they are transgressing) rather than be-meyzid (knowing that they are committing a transgression).” Perhaps the same could be said here, after all it is said that one can often find frum yidden, even Chassidim, and ball games. In the later part of the Chayei Adam cited above he writes that even in his generation there were lomdim who weren't careful to refrain from speaking leitzanus (mockery). There are, however, plenty of sources available which speak of this prohibition so it seems safe to discuss it openly, but it could be that some do feel that way but aren't going to be discussing the prohibition openly in order that they should explain they don't think it should be discussed openly.

And, it could be that I'm all wet. If anyone has any sources to add which would present an opposing view point I would greatly appreciate it. Even if you doubt I would be persuaded, believe me anything that can help me be dan l'kaf zchus is always appreciated. But it seems to me that the oft repeated claim that this only applied when there was idolatry or gladiators seems to have no basis whatsoever in the Poskim. Likewise while Rav Scheinberg is a gadol and I could not fault his talmidim for accepting his psak, it seems very difficult to make a distinction between these events in the time of the Magen Avraham or Mishneh Berurah (even Jewish operated events) and now to permit them. This is especially when we consider that the motivating factor for the prohibition is that not only is one not learning Torah but that it will lead to more bitul Torah down the line.

Update

In the above (I believe) I did not address the issue of watching Television. I have an impression that their is a psak by Rav Moshe Feinstien zt'l, Rav Shach zt'l, and as I recall Rav Kamenetzky zt'l (?) which says watching Television is ossur, but I have not been able to see this inside. Nevertheless, while I am inclined to believe that their is halachic issues which may be strong enough to present an issur, my understanding of Moshav Leitzim as presented above would preclude Television as a medium from this category (although, like a book, a program could be "moshav leitzim" based on content). That is to say the same otherwise "kosher" show seen at a movie theater would be moshav leitzim, while it is not in the comfort of your own home. It seems that this understanding has support in a teshuvah of the Mishneh Halachos (6:270) of Rabbi Menashe Klein shlita discussed here.

It was also interesting to notice that among his text message psakim, Rabbi Shlomo Aviner shlita has the following:

Q: Is it a sanctification of Hashem's Name if an Israeli sports team is victorious?
A: No. To be a sanctification of Hashem, it needs to be a mitzvah, and competitive sports are a "Moshav Leitzim" (frivolity).

John, this one's for you

While I recognize that other people do visit this site, and apologize for not having something more universally relevant, I thought that, well, this is right up your alley John. Maybe you can answer the question, "Anyone want to tell us what it's about?"

http://onthemainline.blogspot.com/2009/02/r-jonathan-eybeschuetz-in-nearly.html

Genetics and Apparent Age

I'm terribly sorry for the drought of posts and thank all who have continued stopping by.

Previously we have shown that the default in our tradition is that the narratives of the Torah are to be taken literally and any allegorical truth is in addition to the pshat. We have noted that additional apparent age is a logical necessity from the literal account of B'reshis and not just a speculative possibility. We have also seen that the common decent of man from our common ancestor Adam is a fundamental principle and argued that even according to the more liberal standard of the Rambam it may not be permissible to reject the literal meaning of a Torah passage without deductive proof.

I would like to pause to re-emphasize the significance of this last point. In order to discuss the propriety of allegorizing the Torah we must accept for the argument that there is good reason to believe it to be Divine Revelation and therefore true. Otherwise in the absence of such reason there is no justification for allegorizing an account that has no indications it is merely a metaphor, but rather we would logically conclude it was simply an erroneous account. [Recently a commenter at another blog argued that there was textual basis to understand the account allegorically in the term "day" being used before the creation of the sun. When I pointed out that "day" was largely understood literally, he responded that a couple hundred years ago that is how they probably would of understood it too!]

So accepting that the Torah is true, and recognizing that the burden of proof is on those who wish to say that truth is allegorical and not-literal, then we must recognize that B'reshis is essentially divinely revealed testimony about how the world was created. We also must recognize that God's general plan was that the world operate according to the laws of nature as we know them. If God has told us He created the world in a certain manner but to have done so would essentially require miraculous intervention in nature for it to be as it is today, it is an argument from silence to argue that God didn't make such interventions and therefore posit that His testimony is really allegorical.

Wolfishmusings.blogspot.com/2007/02/goodbye-gosse.html makes an argument that seems to be a very good way at "testing" the Apparent Age approach's ability to solve the difficulties. In it he points out that through genetics science can identify when a species most recently shared a single common ancestor and it is common that they have not shared a common ancestor since long before Adam HaRishon's time.

In the generations following the Mabul, but especially those from Adam HaRishon, would not have enough genetic variety to support a healthy population. The association between birth defects and relatives, especially siblings, reproducing has long been recognized. Divine intervention would not be a matter of hashgacha pratis, but merely of hashgacha klalis, a necessary measure for the healthy development of the species.

Conceding that such divine intervention took place, as we must from an account which on the one hand presents the origin of the species from at the most a handful of pairs and on the other is completely unconcerned with the long known and statistically significant chance of genetic defects from such unions, it is more reasonable than not that the genetic variation necessary would be correlated with the general plan He had for the biological laws of nature. Again, while the account does not explicitly elaborate on such an intervention, it is a necessary condition for the simple meaning of the account even based on a pre-modern understanding of the reproduction of close relatives. And if something is inferred by necessity by the simple meaning then evidence which it can account for does not provide sufficient reason to allegorize the account.

Now it is all well and good to argue that apparent age is a logical necessity for the simple meaning of the text, and that divine intervention in the gene pool is also a logical necessity. It is not, however, logically necessary that there be a correlation between apparent age and genetics. But neither is there correlation an argument for allegorization. And while it is not logically necessary, insofar as the world was created as a way to conceal God to allow for free will, the alignment of the physical evidence in a [generally] unified and coherent scientific/materialistic system, despite several directly supernatural occurrences, is understandable if not expected.

I hope to elaborate/explore the role of free will's relevance to the natural world more thoroughly later, as well as the relationship between the teivah/nature as God way of running the world and it's applicability to the pre-Creation era/Retroactive Existence.

I do not mean to make light of the challenge this argument presents, but starting with the assumption that we have reason to believe that the Torah is God's account of Creation I do not believe the challenge is sufficient to disregard it. And if we remember that, insofar as common ancestry via Adam HaRishon is a "fundamental principle" which cannot be allegorized if there is any other alternative even according to the Rambam, the theoretical possibility of divine intervention negates the basis to allegorize even without the above reasons to infer it occurred. The conclusions of genetics are immanently reasonable inferences from the scientific evidence, not deductive/demonstrable proof of what occurred.

The Rambam warns that if one, "reject[s] things as impossible which have never been proved to be impossible, or which are in fact possible, though their possibility be very remote, then you will be like Elisha Aher; you will not only fail to become perfect, but will become exceedingly imperfect" (Guide 1:32, Freidlander page 42, emphasis mine).

Sinning Bare-Headed

Igros Moshe O.C. 2:95
“And on the matter of entering a theater or movies, behold, it is something forbidden, and how is it relevant to permit removing one’s hat and being bare headed for it? He adds sin on top of his sin. And if the question is about one who is seized by his inclination to go there, and will not listen to not going, perhaps it is good that he remove his hat so that there will not be a chilul Hashem, since they will not know he is a Torah observant Jew. This is a great reason but only if intended l’shem shemayim. However since it is implausible to say that one seized by the inclination actually has intent l’shem shamayim, rather to belittle the matter even further with uncovering his head, therefore there is nothing to permit it.”

Kol Koreh against Gezel Sheina

HaMercaz has a notice by the Rabbanim of Kiriyat Sanz requesting that it's residents not to work on constructing their Succos after 10 P.M. out of consideration for their neighbors and their sleep, especially the elderly, children, and the ill.

ודברים אלו נוגעים לשכנים ומדות שבין אדם לחברו שאין יום הכיפורים מכפר

ורח"ל דבר שגורם למחלוקת בין השכנים וכדי שלא יהיה ח"ו מצוה הבאה בעבירה

"And these maters are relevant to neighbors and good manners 'between a person and his fellow' about which Yom Kippur doesn't atone.

And God forbid that something should descend into strife between neighbors, so that it will not be (chas v'Shalom) a 'mitzvah that comes by way of a transgression.'

Some how notices like this don't get as wide of circulation on line as more "sensational" ones.

Rav Chaim Berlin zt'l on Chassidim

The Seforim Blog has a very interesting, and I believe important, psak of Rav Chaim Berlin zt'l, which apparently has been left out of a new edition of his teshuvos:

ולהתפלל בבית הכנסת של החסידים אין שום חשש בזה, וגזירת רבינו הגר"א ז"ל לא הי' אלא בזמנו שהקילו אז בכבוד תלמידי חכמים לומדי תורה, ולא כן בימינו שהחסידים חולקים כבוד לכל לומדי תורה והם יראי ה' ושומרים תורה ומצוה

"And to pray in a Chassidic synagogue, there isn't any reason to be concerned about this. The decree of our Master the Gra z'l (HaGoan Rav Eliyahu zt'l, the Vilna Gaon) was only in his time since they were lax then regarding the honor of scholars who study Torah, and this is not so on our days when the Chassidim give honor to all students of Torah, and they are God fearing and observe Torah and Mitzvos."

Parshas Vayeira: The Expulsion of Hagar

I apologize for allowing Shabbos to pass without having posted on the parsha. Truthfully the only thing I could think of was a counter-missionary theme which I just couldn’t bring myself to write. There’s a lot I want to write on that topic but I burnt out a long time ago. Then, over Shabbos, the obvious post came to me.

In parshas Vayeira we read of Hagar being expelled from the house of Avraham Avinu after Yishmael’s behavior proves to be a spiritual and/or physical danger to Yitzchak. The more attentive may have noticed that it was only the parsha before when we read that Hagar had previously left Avraham’s household. The similarities are obvious. In either instance we find that Hagar leaves in reaction to Sarah Imeinu and subsequently is found in the desert by an angel near water.

But from there the two passages drastically differ. On the one hand we see that the earlier account in Chapter 16 uses the name of Hashem throughout, while our account (Chapter 21) uses Eloqim. It is little surprise then, that proponents of the Document Hypothesis attribute the former account to J (at least those verses which deal with Hagar running away, there are a few verses which are attributed to P) while the later account is attributed to E.

Other differences, however, are much more significant to the narrative and seem to imply that we are dealing with two entirely separate incidents and not merely different traditions of one event being preserved along side each other. Even without being familiar with the narratives the astute reader may have noticed above that the narrative in our Parsha is about Hagar being expelled while the prior account is one of her running away. In the earlier account it was her decision, albeit in order to escape Sarah, while in our parsha the decision was made for her. In our parshah she is expelled along with Yishmael, because of Yishmael’s behavior, while in the earlier account Yishmael had yet to be born and the friction in the household was attributed to her attitude. In the first account she is found safe beside a spring of water, while in the later she and Yishmael are saved from dying of thirst by the angel.

Perhaps the most significant difference between the two accounts is that in the initial account Hagar is instructed by the angel to return. The account in our parsha represents a final departure of Hagar and Yishmael from Avraham’s household. Without the later account there is no final resolution of the conflict in the former. This is especially so when we consider that the angel’s instruction for Hagar to return was by no means accompanied by any assurance that things would be easier, but rather that she was expected to submit to Sarah (16:9) and that the son she was to bear was going to live a life of conflict (16:12). To place our parsha’s narrative in, essentially, a separate book would leave the story incomplete. In fact, as near as I can tell “J” never really gets around to Yishmael even being born much less give any indication of the outcome of the instruction to return.

Hagar’s relationship with Sarah was broken. Although God’s Attribute of Mercy, indicated by the use of the name Hashem, assured that Yishmael had the benefit of spending his formative years in the presence of Avraham his father (an experience which undoubtedly made it easier for him to eventually do teshuva), this was not a long term solution. The issues which created the initial conflict were not resolved and eventually were manifest in Yishmael, at which point God with His Attribute of Judgment sided with Sarah that they could not stay and risk harming the well being of Yitzchak. It is hardly unprecedented for a troubled family to “reconcile” only to once again face separation when the problems continue or worsen. These two accounts are much more coherent when taken together than as two competing versions of the same story.

Chayei Sarah: The Eliezer Doublet

The bulk of Parshas Chayei Sarah is the well known account of Avrohom sending his servant, whom we are told is Eliezer (see Genesis 15:2), to find a wife from among Avrohom’s family for his son Yitzchok (Genesis 24). After traveling to Aram Naharim he waited by the well and prayed that God would send Yitzchok a proper shidduch to be identified by responding to his request for water with an offer to water his camels also. Rivka arrives and exceeds expectation.

When Rivka and Eliezer arrived at her home to meet her family, relatives of Avrohom, we are confronted with one of the clearest examples of a repetitive narrative to be found in the Chumash. Sixteen pesukim, almost as much as either of the two other narratives in this parsha, are dedicated to Eliezer telling Rivka’s family about the events we have just read about, with a few small differences.

From a purely stylistic standpoint this is hugely redundant. It, for all practical purposes, could be described as a doublet, “A doublet is a case of the same story being told twice. Even in translation it is easy to observe that biblical stories often appear with variation in detail in two different places in the Bible. There are two different stories of the creation of the world. There are two stories of the covenant between God and the patriarch Abraham…” (Who Wrote the Bible? Richard Elliot Freedman, page 22). Why was it necessary to give a full review rather than simply a generic one similar to that found in verse 30, “Thus has the man spoken to me”? Certainly this passage is much more repetitive, and more noticeable, than the account of creation found in Genesis 2.

But while this narrative has the stylistic difficulty which otherwise suggest to academics that we have multiple sources, such a position isn’t really helpful here. This repetition is totally dependant upon the original. The context of the account is clearly one of Eliezer telling the story, which requires the events to have already transpired. Furthermore, we might note, that the use of the divine names in either part of the narrative is consistent.

Presumably for these very reasons this narrative, despite its repetitive nature, is attributed in its entirety to “J” by Freidman (ibid page 248) and is not really considered a doublet. So while it may be argued that generally it is easier to attribute such “redundant” accounts to multiple sources in this case we are simply faced with the fact that the author/editor/redactor was content with presenting the material in a way that we would not choose stylistically. And when one notes the subtle differences I would argue that at least in this case “Those who defended the traditional belief” and argued that the differences “came to teach us a lesson by their ‘apparent’ contradiction” where correct. (see ibid page 22).

יפה שיחתן של עבדי אבות לפני המקום מתורתן של בניהם

R. Gil Student has followed up his post Seven Unconvincing Arguments for the Documentary Hypothesis with the veryinteresting Lot and the Flood.

Natural Selection is Apikorses. Period. (כנ"ל anyways)

In light of my earlier discussion on Creation Yesh m’Ayin inevitably leading to the appearance of age (and perhaps best thought of as actual "Retroactive Existence") prior to that creation, one might recognize that I have a tendency to let empirical science operate according to its own methods and assumptions and see no inherent need to conform its conclusions to the Torah and certainly no need to conform Torah to its conclusions. I suspect that there are those who will see such an approach as either radically liberal and to still others it will appear stubbornly conservative. For the most part I believe that the same conclusions apply to the evidence of the fossil record and genetics (I know I still owe you a post on this one) with respect to the Theory of Evolution. There is one important caveat to my position on Evolution that I must discuss.

Reading various discussions amongst Orthodox Jews regarding how to relate to Evolution, and works which discuss it, I was always aggravated by two interrelated problems. One was that the primary focus was always on the “history” side of the equation, which I found to be of little to no consequence. The second was those who sought to live their lives and form their opinions based on Torah, but found it absolutely inconceivable that one could identify Evolution as heresy (even though HaRav Moshe Feinstein zt’l paskened to edit/censor textbooks which contained such references[1]). The common denominator to either issue is the overlooking the real problem with evolution: Natural Selection.

“natural selection the mechanism proposed by Charles DARWIN by which gradual evolutionary changes take place. Organisms that are better adapted to the environment in which they live produce more viable young, increasing their proportion in the population and, therefore, being selected. Such a mechanism depends on the variability of individuals within the population. The variability arises through MUTATION, the beneficial mutants being preserved by NATURAL SELECTION.” (The Harper Collins Dictionary: Biology, Page 377).

For the theist who seeks to incorporate Evolution into his or her worldview, whether due to not wishing to seem as a boor to academia or due to an actual understanding and acceptance of the empirical evidence which underlies Evolution, I believe the full implication of Natural Selection and its philosophical significance have been overshadowed. The notion that variations in a population allow them to adapt better to their environment and in turn to be more successful in producing offspring is essentially observable so in light of the other evidence it does not seem improbable to attribute such adaptation could lead to speciation given sufficient time.

Nevertheless “Natural Selection” is not just “natural selection” of variations which help the species adapt. More is implied by the term.

“This thesis is the Principle of the Origin of Species by Natural Selection. It asserts that natural selection operating on variations is not only a sufficient condition for the origin of a species but also the only sufficient condition[2] for the origin of any species” (The Logic and Methodology of Science and Pseudoscience, Fred Wilson, page 150).

Not only can such a process be understood as a theory in accordance with the laws of nature, but it can and should be understood as in and of itself sufficient to explain the existence of life and all of its species without any divine guidance. Any attempt at suggesting a Creator’s involvement is unnecessary and undesirable. “Guided” evolution is anathema to “Natural Selection”.

This distinction is not merely the later spin of those antagonistic to faith. Already in Darwin’s writings we read such an implication.

“Several writers have misapprehended or objected to the term Natural Selection. Some have even imagined that natural selection induces variability, whereas it only implies the preservation of such variations as arise and are beneficial to the being under its condition of life…Others have objected that the term selection implies conscious choice in the animals which becomes modified; and it has even been urged that, as plants have no volition, natural selection is not applicable to them! It has been said that I speak of natural selection as an active power or Deity” (The Origin of the Species, Charles Darwin Chapter 4 page 89, Mentor Edition).

Darwin found it necessary to respond to early detractors who did not find his use of the term “natural selection” materialistic enough. Whether a deity, choice of the animal itself, or a force in and of itself, their understanding of “natural selection” was deemed to be too active. Darwin reassured them “natural selection” was merely a passive description of the positive outcome brought by random changes which proved beneficial to that species. “Natural Selection” is only personified by verbal necessity, in truth it meant to obviate the need for such active design of variation. It is a strictly material process which allows the clock to function in the absence of the clockmaker, if indeed there was a clock maker.

Such a view is unacceptable within Judaism. It is one thing to interpret data in exclusively according to the laws of Nature. It is quite another to declare the laws of Nature independent of the Creator. The laws of Nature are entirely dependent upon the existence of Hashem, “If one would imagine that He does not exist, no other being could possibly exist” (Rambam Yesodei HaTorah 1:3). While one may recognize that something has a naturalistic explanation one may not deny God’s active participation since nature itself is an act of God.

This is the real the heart of the conflict between Torah and Evolution and the common philosophy of science in the academic world today. Prior to the theory of Evolution many issues which we consider conflicts between religion and science had arisen, but none had led to such a degree of agnosticism and atheism. While material explanations could be found for the works of nature, the existence of the Universe and especially life in its complexity testified to the existence of a Designer. But Darwin’s theory of “Natural Selection” seemed to provide the mechanism by which, by chance, variations could lead to the multiplicity of life forms on Earth. “The British biologist Richard Dawkins, an outspoken defender of Darwin and nonbeliever famously wrote that evolution ‘made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist.” (Newsweek Nov. 18, 2005 page 56). Even life, it seemed, could now be understood as originating in a strictly materialist way without resorting to a Creator.

Darwin was not, however, the first to suggest life in its complexity originated through a serious of chances.

First Theory—There is no Providence at all for anything in the Universe;…This is the theory of Epicurus, who assumes also that the Universe consists of atom, that these have combined by chance, and have received their various forms by mere accident…Aristotle has proved the absurdity of the theory, that the whole Universe could have originated by chance; he has shown that, on the contrary, there is a being that rules and governs the Universe. Guide to the Perplexed 282

“But it would be quite useless to mention the opinions of those who do not recognize the existence of God, but believe that the existing state of things is the result of accidental combination and separation of the elements, and that the Universe has no Ruler or Governor. Such is the theory of Epicurus and his school, and similar philosophers, as stated by Alexander [Aphrodisiensis]; it would be superfluous to repeat their views, since the existence of G-d has been demonstrated whilst their theory is built upon a basis proved to be untenable.” (Guide to the Perplexed page 173, emphasis mine)

The Aruch explains that the Hebrew term for “heretic”, Apikores, was derived from the Greek philosopher Epicurus. Epicurus’ belief that the world was the result of accident and chance could be understood as the archetypal k’firah (heresy). But Epicurus’ approach wasn’t rejected because it failed to provide a natural history account of the origin of the species; it was rejected because any such scenario based on chance was in-credible. Darwin’s observations about the fossil record, variations in species allowing them to adapt better, and his recognition that better adaptation increases the possibility of survival and reproduction produced a theory which far exceeded anything Epicurus could have produced in his wildest dreams with respect to a natural history. But Darwin’s theory did no more to show that such natural processes could be plausibly understood as accidental occurrences independent of Design. The argument from design doesn’t assert that we cannot account for creation by “natural means”. Rather it argues that it cannot be relegated to chance. To the materialist who believed that if God existed, He played no active part in the running of the world, the possibility of explaining our development according to natural laws was automatically equated with confirmation of this materialistic assumption. But there is a difference between explaining a process, albeit “natural”, and demonstrating that process is possible by mere chance. As evidence for strict materialism “Natural Selection” was preaching to the choir. It allowed an atheist to feel “intellectually fulfilled”, but in truth it only pushed the argument from design under the rug.

The difficulty with Natural Selection is not the process but the philosophical assumption that is bundled in with the term in its standard use. Undoubtedly there are many scientists who in their own philosophy of science are much more liberal in their understanding of “natural selection”. They may not have difficulty understanding it as a naturalistic explanation that does not demand rejection of the supernatural, or at least are not bothered by those who take such an approach. Perhaps it is perfectly acceptable for a theist to speak of “natural selection”, but despite the clear overlap in meaning it is essentially only verbal agreement. We may accept survival of the fittest as a natural law, not as a self-sufficient explination for the creation of the species. Perhaps a book which speaks of natural selection without explicitly discussing its hard-line philosophical rejection of the supernatural may not be strictly prohibited, but it might be analogous to a Christian discussion on the Unity of God which doesn’t directly address their belief in the Trinity.[3] Should such need arise one must consult a competent Posek. Any work which speaks of “Natural Selection” in such a way that it is obviously meant to preclude the need, or even possibility, of the Divine is heretical and forbidden to be read by Jewish law other than the purposes of refuting them. Regardless of one’s feelings regarding evolution, Darwin’s Theory of Natural Selection contains elements which are heretical and forbidden by Jewish law to believe or to study.

[1]It appears to me that while Rav Feinstein zt’l did not explicitly mention evolution etc. but being a p’sak on practical halachah the only reasonable inference is it discussed such subject matter and it is impossible to infer he spoke of only hypothetical k’firah.

[2]“A sufficient condition for the occurrence of an event is a circumstance in whose presence the event must occur.” (Introduction to Logic, Irving M. Copi, page 400, bold mine)

[3]The difference being one can think of better reasons to learn from a science textbook than a Christian theological discussion of G-d’s unity but…

Image of planet outside our solar system.

Parshas Lech Lecha: The Master of the Mansion

Our tradition begins with Avrohom Avinu. He is the physical, but even more so the spiritual, father of the Jewish people. The narrative of the Chumash does not enlighten us on the youth of Avrohom Avinu or the origin of his awareness of Hashem. Upon our “introduction” to him he is already receiving the prophetic instruction to leave his homeland for Eretz Ca’anan. Chazal, whether by tradition, inference from the text, or homily, provide us much more information about this period. We are given a glimpse into the world of Avrohom and how he came into recognition of the Holy One blessed be He. This information was not transmitted out of mere historical or biographical curiosity, but in an effort to implant the emunah of Avrohom into our own hearts.

בראשית רבה לך לך לט:א

א"ר יצחק משל לאחד שהיה עובר ממקום למקום. וראה
בירה אחת דולקת. אמר תאמר שהבירה הזו בלא מנהיג. הציץ עליו בעל הבירה. א"ל אני הוא
בעל הבירה. כך לפי שהיה בעל העולם

In the B’reishis Rabba on Parshas Lech Lecha (39:1) R. Yitzchak relates that Avrohom Avinu was like a traveler who encountered a certain mansion. The traveler wondered if it were possible that such a mansion could be without a master. It is not consistent without our experience for mansions to occur on their own. The existence of the mansion leads one to infer that there is a master responsible for its existence and maintenance.

Rav Sa’adia Goan uses a similar analogy in his “Emunos v’Deos”:

Furthermore I say that if they are right, so far as their doctrine of chance is concerned, let them show us or state that it is possible for the parts of a house, namely the stones and the wood, to unite by themselves and fall into order and combine so as to constitute a house.[1]

Avrohom Avinu, with his great spiritual sensitivity and purity of heart, was able to perceive that the very existence of the world implied that there was a Creator. This point was made later on by the Creator Himself in His rhetorical question to the prophet Yeshayahu, “Lift up your eyes on high and see, who created these, who takes out their host by number; all of them He calls by name; because of His great might and because He is strong in power, no one is missing.” (Isaiah 40:26) Similarly we read in T’hillim, “The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament tells of His handiwork” (19:2).

Avrohom Avinu was able to see more clearly the very basic inference which is at the heart of the nearly universal human search for the divine. We must therefore attempt to understand why the entire world isn’t similarly enlightened by this truth even as they maintain a basic cognizance of it.

First we must recognize the nature of the inference here. The Rambam in his Moreh Nuvachim[2] addresses this inference, and employs it, but does not find it sufficient. Due to the prevailing (and ancient) disagreement among the philosophers about whether the universe had a beginning or not, the argument would not be compelling, not be conclusive, for those who held the opinion that the universe was eternal (a position that I do not believe has much relevance today). The Rambam felt that it was the best approach to take was to provide such arguments that would not be refutable. The Rambam wanted the existence of the Creator to be demonstrated conclusively. Similarly we have the Kuzari who argues that Moshe Rabbeinu identified God as the “God of the Hebrews” when speaking to Pharaoh (Ex. 7:16) rather than as the “God of heaven and earth” or as the Creator, since Pharaoh would have denied creation.[3] We must therefore consider the two types of arguments as are known from the science of logic, a deductive argument and an inductive argument. A deductive argument is one where, insofar as the premises are correct, the conclusion is demonstrably proven from those premises and nothing more could be added that could possible change the truth of that conclusion. An inductive argument, on the other hand is one where the conclusion follows logically from the premises but there remains a possibility, even if it is an exceedingly remote one, that the conclusion could be shown incorrect if other proof where presented. While fools can grandstand and ignore the truth of any conclusion no matter how firmly established, the correctness of an inductive argument is clearly more subjective and it is much easier to ignore such an argument’s strength and still hold a pretext of reason. Both the Rambam and the Kuzari seemed to recognize that our inference was of this later category of inductive reasoning and felt that in the various contexts another approach was more appropriate.

We should not, however, mistakenly assume that this represents a חסרון in the reasoning חו״ש. Much of what we “know” is based off of inductive reasoning, and insofar as very few premises, if any, are actually known with absolute certainty, most of our reasoning has a strong inductive element. Despite all of the interesting and perhaps at times useful philosophical/epistemological questions one might pose, we would be intellectually paralyzed without such inductive reasoning. While the Rambam, like other philosophers, would prefer a deductive argument which provides demonstrable proof, I believe that the majority of our Rabbi’s (especially among the Acharonim) have guided us down the path of Emunah Peshuta. We are not asked to believe that which there is no reason to believe, but we are expected to content ourselves with the very basic truth that if not impossible, then it is inconceivable that creation not have a Creator.

Furthermore, this cloud of uncertainty, as slight as it is, plays a very important, even essential, role. Insofar as the existence of the Creator is the fundamental truth with which mankind must reckon, God’s plan for man having free choice (which cannot be dealt with at length here) would require that there be an alternative explanation to the existence of the world than a Creator. While this alternative does not have to be “possible” strictly speaking, it must at least seem plausible enough that those who so chose can grasp onto such a position, while at the same time not so compelling as to render one blameless for accepting it.

With this in mind it is worthwhile to consider the moshol used by Rabbi Akiva to illustrate this idea (which I have not seen inside yet). It is related that a certain heretic approached Rabbi Akiva challenging him to demonstrate God’s existence. Rabbi Akiva replied by asking that the heretic demonstrate how his garment came into being. The analogy of a garment is particularly apt, since the purpose of a garment is to conceal. A person is both concealed by his garments, and identified with them as was the case with Yosef when he approached his brothers. Nature, creation, conceals the Creator while testifying to His existence.

On the one hand we should beware and recognize that while we can infer the Creator from creation, we can infer very little else. Knowledge of the Creator, His will and His attributes, cannot be attained by philosophical speculation but only Revelation. We might suppose certain things based on analogy from human intelligence but that is an exceedingly imperfect analogy (though perhaps more fruitful than a dogmatic agnosticism in absence of Revelation). Ultimately even Avrohom was dependant upon the “Master of the Mansion” revealing Himself and the Divrei Chaim on this parsha explains that had this not been the case even Avrohom Avinu would have been ensnared by the pitfalls of philosophical speculation חו״ש. We can rightly infer that there is a Creator of creation but we should not conflate that conclusion with evidence for a specific theological system (correct or not) since that is a matter of revelation and not philosophical enquiry.

On the other hand we must not engage in sophomoric attempts at denying this very basic inference from analogy. Again, analogies are often precarious things, and formalizing them begs us to analyze whether they are sound. But analogy is not either/or, it is a matter of judgment. It seems to me that when our initial instinct does not find it plausible that everything is the result of chance, as is the case with most people, this is a less biased analysis than an overly technical one which tries to find dissimilarities when in any other situation we would not conclude that something observed was merely the product of natural chance. We must refuse to find philosophical loopholes to avoid this obvious realization. We may not be able to find a philosophically sound definition of knowledge, by comparison, but that doesn’t mean we wouldn’t fail a lie detector test if we denied ‘knowledge’ of an event we had witnessed.

And we must beware, then, that we do not become presumptuous and dismiss this fundamental evidence for the Creator based on a mere “possibility” to the contrary. It is certainly a ploy of the yetzer hara for us to dismiss an argument found in the Rishonim, Geonim, Chazal, and the Nevi’im! One should know that to “believe” in something that one feels there is no reason to believe in is an impossibility. Such “belief” is fantasy and make-believe, one doesn’t believe, they wish it to be. That is not to say, חו״ש, that those who profess such a position are not believers. Indeed the descendants of Avrohom are “believers the sons of believers” and I recall hearing, in the name of one of the Rebbes from Ger I believe, that even when faced with doubt one must have emunah that one really has emunah. Rather an individual does have reason, correct or otherwise, to establish their emunah, but such a denial has a corrosive effect which will damage their emunah or even lead them or those they influence to a place of bitter waters ר״ל.

The path of Avrohom is, it seems to me, the path of Emunah Peshuta, an embrace of the simple recognition that creation has a Creator and embracing that the Creator has revealed Himself, to Avrohom through prophecy and to us through His Torah. One does not need to engage in endless enquiries in search of demonstrative proofs but recognize that we have sufficient reason to believe. Conversely emunah does not require that one does not ‘know” one’s belief is true, the Torah tells us that the B’nei Yisroel had faith in Hashem and Moshe even though they certainly “knew” as well, having witnessed open miracles and having attained prophecy. Rather we should not concede that it is even logically possible that the world not have a Creator. We should not pretend that we can believe in that which we deny reason to believe in, but we should neither pretend that our intellect is the final authority and is capable in finding all of the answer about the metaphysical realm.

[1] The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, Rav Sa’adia Gaon page 75 trans. Samuel Rosenblatt, Yale University Press.
[2] See page 110, 111
[3] 1:25, Metzudah page 3, 5.